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A Cause of Action against Private Contractors and the U.S.
Government for Freedom of Speech Violations in Iraq
A popular Government, without popular information or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy
or perhaps both . . . and a people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.
-James Madison, 18221
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I. Introduction
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .. ."' The First Amendment's
guarantees of freedom of expression are arguably the most
generous in the world. Even international human rights laws on
the subject do not meet the high standards American lawmakers
set for protection of freedom of speech.3  Therefore, it is
disappointing that when acting outside the domestic sphere, the
U.S. government takes no such care to protect the principles of
freedom of expression. Unconstitutional behavior in the
international sphere by the American government and by
American corporations should be actionable in American courts,
regardless of whether the behavior targets Iraqis or Americans.
Since the American invasion of Iraq began in March 2003, the
American government and private contractors have denied Iraqis
the same freedom of the press that their American counterparts
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Russian Federation Violations of Human Rights
and International Humanitarian Law in the Chechen Republic, Mar. 1, 2000,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/ndex/engEUR460142000; Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia: Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, 10 HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. 9
(1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/kosovo/; see also 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily
ed. April 2, 1992) (During hearings on the ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Senator Moynihan noted that "some have raised concerns
about the standards in the covenant having to do with free speech. I strongly support the
administration's reservation on this provision and believe that by ratifying the covenant
the United States will be in a position to help prevent misinterpretation and abuse of this
provision.").
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enjoy.
Section II of this Comment examines the possibility of a legal
solution to violations of American and international freedom of
speech laws that have occurred in Iraq, explores the possibility of
expanding Bill of Rights protections to non-citizens, and argues
for prosecution of extraterritorial freedom of speech violations in
American courts. Section III focuses on the nature of American
freedom of speech protections, how they have evolved, and how
they might be applied to a society as divided and unstable as Iraq.
Section IV exposes the denials of freedom of the press that have
occurred in Iraq since American military operations began in
2003. Additionally, Section IV compares Iraq and Bosnia,
contrasting the way that Bosnia's more lenient media controls
have benefited the society. Section V examines one possible
remedy for the denial of free speech in Iraq: a tort claim against
American contractors or the American government. Sections VI
and VII address alternative remedies for the present situation,
including legislative solutions. Like every other problem currently
facing Iraq, there is no quick fix for the free speech denials
occurring throughout the country. This Comment examines the
many facets of this issue, making a case for a legal solution to the
problem posed by the lack of a free press in Iraq.
II. The Brandenburg Standard
The 2003 American invasion of Iraq was dubbed "Operation
Iraqi Freedom. ' '4 On March 19, 2003, the United States began
military operations against Iraq. The primary goals of the
operation were to remove the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction and to remove the country's regime from power.' The
coalition forces were unable to find any weapons of mass
destruction in the country, but managed to capture Saddam
Hussein, who is currently awaiting trial.6 The accomplishment of
the latter goal, regime change, has brought with it the
4 Global Security.org., Operation Iraqi Freedom (Mar. 19, 2003),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi-freedom.htm.
5 Id.
6 Saddam "Caught Like a Rat" in a Hole, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD
/meast/12/14/sprj.irq.saddam.operation; see also Neil Mackay, US: Saddam Had No
Weapons of Mass Destruction, SUNDAY HERALD ONLINE, May 4, 2003,
http://www.sundayherald.com/33628.
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responsibility of establishing a new Iraqi government.
By March 2004, the American Coalition Provisional Authority
established a "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period."7  This transitional law has since been
replaced with a new, permanent constitution. 8  The constitution
was ratified by the Iraqi people in an October 15 nationwide
referendum. 9  This new constitution protects "the freedom of
press, publishing, media, and distribution... as long as it does not
violate public order and morality."'" Additionally, Article 44 of
the new constitution guarantees "all individuals . . . the right to
enjoy the rights stated in international human rights agreements
and treaties endorsed by Iraq that don't run contrary to the
principles and rules of this Constitution."'I The new Iraqi
government has yet to live up to these promises: two widely
televised Arab-language news broadcasters have been shut out of
Iraq, 2 dissident newspapers have been closed, and American-
sponsored propaganda is attempting to drown out opposition
within the country. 3
A. The Evolution of American Freedom of Speech Law
Modem American freedom of the press law originated during
World War I (WWI), with the creation of the "clear and present
7 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 14, Law of Administration for the State of
Iraq for the Transitional Period, Preamble, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/govemment
/TAL.html.
8 See James Yoch, "UN Certifies Iraqi Constitution Referendum Results," Oct. 25,
2000, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/10/un-certifies-iraqi-constitution.php.
9 See id.
10 Iraqi Constitution, art. 36 (Iraq).
11 Id. at art. 44.
12 See Naseer AI-Nahr & Asharq Al-Awsat, Iraq Ban for AI-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya,
ARAB NEWS, Sept. 24, 2003, http://www.arabnews.con/?page=4&section=0&article=
32528&d=24&m=9&y=2003; see also Al-Jazeera Vows toDefy Iraq Ban, AIAZEERA
ONLINE, Aug. 7, 2004, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9C888134-9481-485A-
A675-DD3C50DA224D.htm. Iraq's Foreign Minister Hushiar Zibari has criticized Al-
Arabiya, A1-Jazeera, the Lebanese channel Al-Manar, and Iran's Al-Alam as "channels
of incitement working against the interests, security and stability of the Iraqi people...
we will no longer tolerate this in the future." Id.
13 See A New Voice in the Middle East: Provisional Needs Assessment for Iraqi
Media, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, (May/June 2003), http://www.iwpr.net
/pdf/Iraq-MediaAssessmentReport.pdf [hereinafter Iraq Media Assessment Report].
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danger" test.'4  In Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes'
majority opinion delineated a test to determine whether speech
was constitutionally protected, or could be subject to criminal
punishment. 15 The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. 16
During WWI, the "clear and present danger" test was used to
criminalize the speeches and pamphleteering of otherwise little-
known and ineffectual anti-war activists. 7 The 1925 Gitlow v.
New York decision further narrowed the "clear and present
danger" test, limiting the occasions when it could be applied.' 8
During this wartime era, federal district judge, Learned Hand,
created an alternate test. His 1917 Masses Publishing Co. v.
Pattern opinion states "[i]f one stops short of urging upon others
that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, . . . one should
not be held to have attempted to cause its violation."' 9 During the
following two decades, however, the "clear and present danger"
test, not Hand's alternative test, became the standard.20
14 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
15 Id. Witing for the minority in later decisions (e.g., Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919)), Holmes actually advocated a more speech-protective
approach, where only an immediate, dire need to protect the country would justify
removing the protections of the First Amendment.
16 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
17 See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT IN A
NUTSHELL 66 (West Group ed., 2000); see, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919).
18 268 U.S. 652, 671 (1925).
19 Masses Publ'g Co. v. Pattern, 244 F. 535, 540 (D.N.Y. 1917). (The case was
later reversed, though Hand's test was cited in a number of subsequent decisions. See,
e.g., United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223 (D.N.Y. 1918); see also Whitney v. California,
242 U.S. 357 (1927).) In Gitlow, the court prohibited the peacetime publishing of a
Socialist manifesto, while the Masses court allowed the distribution of anti-war
pamphlets, even though it occurred during the First World War. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at
671; see also Masses, 244 F. 535 at 540.
20 See BARRON & DIENES, supra note 16, at 71; see also Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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B. Brandenburg v. Ohio2
The 1969 decision Brandenburg v. Ohio rejected the "clear
and present danger" test. 2 The State identified the appellant as a
hooded Klansman who led a gathering of a dozen Klansmen, some
armed.2 3  On film, the appellant claimed that the Klan had a
membership in the hundreds throughout Ohio. 4 The Klansmen
made a number of unintelligible threats, but among those recorded
on the film were the phrases, "bury the niggers," "send the Jews
back to Israel," and "[the] nigger will have to fight for every inch
he gets from now on."25 The Supreme Court determined that this
speech was protected under the First Amendment. 6 The majority
held that the promotion of illegal action is Constitutional, "except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."27
According to Constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther, Brandenburg
requires proof that the speaker sought to incite his audience and
that the incitement created an imminent danger of serious harm. 8
The Brandenburg decision overturned Ohio's Criminal
Syndicalism Act, which targeted people who "advocate or teach
the duty, necessity, or propriety of violence as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform," or who publish
21 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
22 See id. The majority cited the Dennis decision, which applied Hand's formula:
"[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' . . . justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Strangely, the Brandenburg majority also
relied on the somewhat contradictory majority opinion in Yates v. United States, which
stressed the "advocacy of action," a greater degree of imminence than required by
Dennis court. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1959).
23 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
24 See id. at 446.
25 Id. at 446.
26 Id. at 448.
27 Id. at 447.
28 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 754-55 (1975); see, e.g.,
NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982), where the court,
applying the two-part Brandenburg test, found that a civil rights activist's statement,
"[[]f we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your
damn neck," was constitutional. Id. at 910. The majority held that one should be free to
"stimulate [an] audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in
a common cause." Id. at 928.
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literature containing such language. 29 This is similar to the Iraqi
broadcasting law developed under U.S. occupation 30 that banned
programming that advocated violence or civil disorder against any
individual, group, or the Coalition Forces.3' Iraqi media laws have
changed very little since the transition of power from the Coalition
Provisional Authority to the new Iraqi government. The old law
contained a list of prohibited activities and allowed the American
Administrator, L. Paul Bremer, to "authorize on-site inspection of
Iraqi media organizations, without notice, in order to ascertain
compliance. 32 When media outlets posed an immediate threat to
Coalition forces or personnel, or a "significant and immediate
threat" to public order, the law allowed the Commander of
Coalition Forces to take any action within the Rules of
Engagement to end the threat that the media outlet posed.33
The Brandenburg Court cited several decisions that followed
Judge Hand's test. In Noto v. United States, the Court held that
"the mere abstract teaching ...of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same
as preparing a group for violent action."34 The petitioner in Noto,
a member of the Communist Party, was convicted under the Smith
Act, which outlawed membership in an organization that
advocates the violent overthrow of the United States government.35
The Court held that there was not enough evidence to prove that
the Communist Party was inciting overthrow "by the use of
language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite a person to
action, immediately or in the future."36
The Brandenburg Court also cited Herndon v. Lowrey, an
earlier decision that allowed the appellant, a prison inmate, to
29 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 448.
30 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 14, § 3, http://www.cpa-iraq.org
/regulations/2003061 0_CPAORD_14_ProhibitedMediaActivity.pdf.
3' Id. § 2.
32 Id. § 3.
33 Id.
34 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-
98 (1961)).
35 See Noto, 367 U.S. at 290.
36 Id. at 297 (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 316).
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solicit fellow prisoners to join the Communist Party. 37  The
Supreme Court held that the Georgia penal statute forbidding
incitement, under which the appellant was charged, was
unconstitutional.38  Similarly, in Bond v. Floyd, the state
government attempted to stop a man from holding elected office,
based on interviews he gave which expressed his admiration for
people who burned their draft cards. 39 The Supreme Court held
that the state's action constituted an unconstitutional denial of
freedom of speech guarantees.4 0  These decisions, which are
arguably more lenient than what are being allowed by the new
Iraqi government today, were all decided under the pre-
Brandenburg "clear and present danger" test that criminalizes a
much broader range of speech than the Brandenburg test.41 These
decisions upheld the right to promote an abstract doctrine, even if
that doctrine itself advocated the overthrow of the American
government.4 2  "Urging," "necessity," and a "duty" to forcibly
overthrow the government were necessary, not just speech on
"desirability" and "propriety.
'
"
43
The National Communications and Media Commission Code
that now controls Iraqi media law echoes the Brandenburg
principles.' The code sets forth the lofty principle that "the right
37 See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259-61 (1937).
38 See id. The statute defined insurrection as an attempt "to induce others to join in
any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the State." Id at 245. The statute
criminalized any attempts to print or circulate "any paper, pamphlet, circular, or any
writing, for the purpose of inciting insurrection, riot, conspiracy, or resistance against the
lawful authority of the State." Id. at 246. The Court found that the statute's reach was
too broad, as speech could only be criminal if the defendant intended to produce criminal
consequences "at any time within which he might reasonably expect his influence to
continue to be directly operative in causing such action." Id. at 254.
39 See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
40 See id. at 134.
41 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
42 See Yates, 354 U.S. at 318.
43 See id. at 302. An AI-Jazeera report that U.S. Marines killed hundreds of
civilians in Fallujah prompted a vitriolic response by Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, who stated: "what Al Jazeera is doing is vicious, inaccurate and inexcusable."
Rowan Scarborough, Al Iraqiya Offers Alternative View, THE WASH. TIMES, April 28,
2004. However, A1-Jazeera's report does not even meet the "clear and present danger"
test.
44 See NCMC Code and Discussion, IRAQ MEDIA DEVELOPMENTS NEWSLETTER
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to free expression has never been extended, in any free society, to
persons or groups who advocate the immediate violent overthrow
of civil order., 45 This may square with the Brandenburg standard,
but the rest of the code cuts deeper into freedom of expression
than Brandenburg's strict test of "imminent lawless action."46
III.The Denial of Freedom of the Press in Iraq
A. Iraqi Media Law Since the Fall of Saddam Hussein
In the months preceding the Spring 2004 transfer of power
from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the interim
Iraqi government, the National Communications and Media
Commission (NCMC), a media regulatory agency, was
developed47 and published a broadcasting code on June 27, 2004.48
The Preamble to the code specifically endorses the freedom of
expression provisions contained in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.49 However, the Commission is allowed to regulate
speech "that may incite, represent or portray violence or ethnic,
national or religious intolerance."5 ° The prohibition on incitement
to violence prohibits material that explicitly or implicitly:
[c]arries the clear and immediate risk of inciting imminent
violence, ethnic or religious hatred, civil disorder or rioting
among the people of Iraq or advocates terrorism, crime or
criminal activities (particular care is required where a
programme carries the views or transmits the messages of
people or organisations who use or advocate terrorism or ...
(Stanhope Ctr. for Communications Policy Research), July 27, 2004,
http://www.stanhopecentre.org/research/26.shtml.
45 See id.
46 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
47 See also Nicolas Pelham, Iraq Sets Up Committees to Impose Restrictions on
News Reporting, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2004, available at http://www.stanhopecentre.org
/research/26.shtml#1. See generally NCMC Code and Discussion, supra note 44. The
Commission is housed in the old information ministry's building, and it is expected that
many of the ministry's former employees will be re-hired to work for the commission.
48 See NCMC Code and Discussion, supra note 42.
49 See id. at Preamble.
50 See NCMC Code and Discussion, supra note 42.
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carries a clear and immediate risk of causing public harm) .... 5l
The code notes that "depiction of a crime in progress, such as a
kidnapping or the imminent threat of illegal execution, for purpose
of extortion, or to spread the message of persons or groups who
advocate the violent overthrow of civil order, is not protected by
any international covenant or human rights guarantee."52  The
American standard is more lenient towards those advocating
illegal activity. In the pre-Brandenburg decision Kingsley Picture
Corp. v. Regents, the Supreme Court repeated the standard that
"advocacy of conduct proscribed by law is not ... a justification
for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of
incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would
be immediately acted on.",53 The Supreme Court dictum in the
1927 decision Whitney v. California is especially relevant in the
instant situation: "Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be
applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for
violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free
speech."54
While the Iraqi Broadcasting Code appears to respect
international freedom of expression standards, the new Iraqi
government has not followed the spirit of the law. Ibrahim Janabi,
the 2005 head of the Higher Media Commission, has said that the
rules of Iraqi broadcasting yet to be finalized will cover
51 Id. NCMC Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of Practice, Rule 1.1
describes "public harm" as "death, injury, damage to property or other violence, or the
diversion of police, medical series or other forces of public order from their normal
duties." The CPA's rules were similar. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order 14 on
banned media activity, which prohibits the broadcasting material that
incites violence against any individual or group, including racial, ethnic or
religious groups and women; incites civil disorder, rioting, or damage to
property; incites violence against Coalition Forces or CPA personnel; advocates
alterations to Iraq's borders by violent means; advocates the return to power of
the Iraqi Ba'ath Party or make statements that purport to be on behalf of the
Iraqi Ba'ath Party.
See Coalition Provisional Authority Order 14, supra note 7. The United States has the
dubious distinction of being the first occupying power with its own website, available at
http://www.cpa.iraq.org.
52 NCMC Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of Practice, Rule 1.1.
53 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376
(1927)).
54 Whitney, 274 U.S.at 378.
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"unwarranted criticism of the prime minister."55 In particular, he
cited a July 2004 sermon by Shi'ia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, which
called Prime Minister Allawi "America's tail."56 Janabi said that
the commission could ban outlets that would broadcast the
sermon. 7 He claimed, "[i]n a difficult security situation, we need
to fight the terrorists by all means, and one of the main means is
the media. We need them all to co-operate, even the private sector.
It's for national security. '
The Harris Corporation, an American contractor which runs
Al-Iraqiya, could lose its annual contract of $99 million if it does
not meet "the targets we want," according to Janabi.5 9 The new
government's attacks against Al-Jazeera began early. A1-Jazeera's
Baghdad bureau was threatened with closure after airing al-Sadr's
speech and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari accused Al-
Jazeera of "one-sided and biased coverage of the situation in
Iraq."6 °  Hoshyar told Al-Jazeera in an interview, "we will not
allow some people to hide behind the slogan of freedom of the
press and media.",
61
55 Pelham, supra note 45.
56 Id.
57 See id.
58 Id. Al-Iraqiya is an Iraqi satellite television station funded by the U.S.
government. Rowan Scarborough, "Al Iraqiya Offers Alternative View," WASH. TIMES
(April 28, 2004), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20040427-
10445803420r.htm. (Al-Iraqiya's English-language website is http://www.iraqimedianet
.net/tv/.)
Al-Janabi, in an Al-Iraqiya broadcast, later denied making such fiery remarks,
claiming to be interested merely in "guidelines." Stanhope Ctr. for Communications
Policy Research, Iraq: Media Body Chief Talks about Press Guidelines, July 27, 2004,
http://www.stanhopecentre.org/research/26.shtml#6.
59 Pelham, supra note 45. Al-Iraqiya is the television channel established by the
IMN, created to compete with or replace news sources such as A1-Jazeera or A1-Araybia.
60 Letter from the Committee to Protect Journalists to Iyad Allawi, Prime Minister
of Iraq (July 29, 2004), http://www.stanhopecentre.org/research/26.shtml#7.
61 Id.
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B. The War for the "Hearts and Minds "62
In the months after Saddam Hussein was ousted, the Iraqi
media blossomed.6 3 The number of newspapers in Iraq increased
from five to 150. 64 However, most of these new media outlets use
partisan mouthpieces, and many are produced by political
65parties. The United States, instead of trying to regulate and
mediate in this fiery atmosphere, chose to join the fray, hoping to
create a media empire large enough to drown out any opposition.66
The Iraqi Media Network (IMN) has been run out of the
Department of Defense's Psychological Operations Division.67
The United States, via the IMN, now runs thirty television and
radio transmitters, three broadcast studios and twelve bureaus
throughout the country.68
The Department of Defense originally awarded the IMN
contract to the San Diego-based Science Applications
62 Seth Fein, The Medium Shapes the Message, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, May 7,
2004, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3831. The Bush administration has
used Arabic language news channels, both American-controlled and independently
owned, to fight the war for the "hearts and minds" of Arabs. Id.
63 Id. During Saddam Hussein's twenty-three year reign, no foreign newspapers or
satellite dishes were allowed. Illegal satellite dishes, and radio stations like the British
Broadcasting Corporation and American-run Radio Sawa were the only sources of
outside news. Bassem Mroue, Freed Iraqis Enjoy a Free Press, WASH. TIMES,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20030520-121039-6396r.htm (May 20, 2003).
64 Fariba Nawa, U.S. Curtails Iraq's Newfound Media Freedoms, THE VILLAGE
VOICE, June 27, 2003, http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0327/nawa.php.
65 Id. See Iraq Media Assessment Report, supra note 13; see also Freed Iraqis
Enjoy a Free Press, supra note 63 (stating that Iraqi journalists acknowledge that many
of their compatriots are "not professional or objective").
66 See Iraq Media Assessment Report, supra note 13 (listing prominent Iraqi
newspapers and describing the political affiliations and ambitions of the editors).
67 See id. The American press has written of a split between the State Department
and the Department of Defense over the American approach to Iraqi media. See
Samantha M. Shapiro, The Arab Media War, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 2, 2005, at 54. The
State Department has "argued for more direct engagement with the Arab media." But
Norman Pattiz, who sits on the Broadcasting Board of Governors, dismisses this State
Department position, because it "presupposes that the indigenous media is the solution,
not the problem." Id.
68 Iraqi Media Assessment Report, supra note 12, at 3; see also U.S. Journalist
Quits Pentagon Iraqi Media Project Calling It U.S. Propaganda, DEMOCRACY Now, Jan.
14, 2004, http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=04/01/14/1555223.
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International Corporation (SAIC).6 9 SAIC received $82.3 million
under this contract, but was heavily criticized for the poor job it
did.70 A prominent network correspondent who consulted for IMN
described the network as "an irrelevant mouthpiece for Coalition
Provisional Authority propaganda."'"
Ahmad al-Rickaby, IMN's highly respected director, resigned
in August 2003, complaining about a lack of funding, equipment,
and qualified personnel.72 The Department of Defense then
transferred control of the IMN to the Florida-based Harris
Corporation.73 By April 2004, the IMN was opening a third
television studio and expanding programming to eighteen hours a
day.74  Harris has been criticized more for censorship than for
fraudulent management. In April 2004, an IMN editor, Ismail
Zaher, and twenty other staff members, complained that Harris
was exerting undue editorial influence. 5 Zaher and the others quit
the IMN's newspaper, AI-Sabah ("The Morning"), to start a new
newspaper, AI-Sabah Jadid ("The New Morning").76 Prior to
assuming control of Al-Sabah, Zaher had twelve years of
experience working for newspapers in Europe.77 He wanted to
turn the paper into a private company by May of 2004.78 He
thought advertising revenue was sufficient to sustain the paper
69 Harris Corporation, Center for Public Integrity, Windfalls of War,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&ddlC=87 (May 20, 2004). Al-
Iraquia, http://www.iraqlinks.comldir/s.asp?l=40420 (in English and Arabic).
70 See Center for Public Integrity, supra note 69.
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 IMN had a total budget of approximately $96 million. See id. Strangely, given
that the IMN is the most expensive U.S. government media project in history, the IMN is
lacking basic funding for equipment like camera batteries, editing equipment, and
satellite dishes. Instead of spending the government funds on creating a new, unbiased
alternative to the old, biased Middle Eastern media, the IMN has bought old programs
from Middle East Broadcasting and Lebanese Broadcasting. See Don North, Iraq: One
Newman's Take on How Things Went Wrong, CORPWATCH-, Dec. 15, 2005,
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=7891.
75 See Center for Public Integrity, supra note 69.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
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without U.S. funding.79 Harris opposed this idea, but has denied
editorial interference.8 °
Other journalists have slammed the IMN's work. Don North,
an American journalist hired to help develop the IMN, quit when it
became evident that the network broadcasts were not gaining
independence.8' North stated that his problem with the IMN was
that the CPA "doesn't seem able to differentiate between public
diplomacy, in other words telling Iraqis and the world what we
Americans are trying to do in Iraq, and giving the Iraqis a voice of
independence that they need themselves., 82 According to North,
the staff hired to run the IMN, both Iraqis and Americans, were
experienced and competent; their goal was to:
make a PBS, a public broadcast radio and TV for the Iraqis. But
instead, it became a mouthpiece for the coalition .... [T]hey
just thought of it as another voice of America, and turned to
other satellite broadcasters like Al-Jazeera and A1-Arabiya ....
[T]hose are the stations they're watching and not the station that
was created for them.
83
North is critical of the IMN's American backers, reporting
that:
a brutal form of [regulation] was delivered by the U.S. Army
and CPA officials when they found stories offensive. They
visited the offices of offending newspapers and often left them
padlocked and in ruins. No mediation, no appeal. If The
Washington Post reported terrorist threats or bin Laden
statements in Baghdad today, it would probably be closed
down.84
79 See id.
80 Scarborough, supra note 43. Though Administrator Bremer transferred control
of Al-Iraqiya to an Iraqi Board of Governors, even before the July transfer of Iraqi
sovereignty, Al-Iraqiya continued to air each CPA briefing. J. Dorrance Smith, a former
ABC executive who worked in the first Bush administration, was Mr. Bremer's senior
media advisor. He claimed, "if you watch [Al-Iraqiya and Al-Jazeera] side by side, the
Al-Jazeera approach to [the Fallujah] story is markedly different than the approach on Al
Iraqiya. Al Jazeera is extremely antagonistic toward the coalition and all of its elements
as a foundation of their coverage." Id.
81 See U.S. Journalist Quits Pentagon Iraqi Media Project Calling It U.S.
Propaganda, supra note 68.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 North, supra note 74.
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C. The Elimination of Opposing Viewpoints
The American and Iraqi governments were not content merely
to compete with opposing viewpoints expressed on networks such
as Al-Jazeera and Al-Iraqiya. They soon began shutting down
stations that provided alternatives to the American message." An
October 2003 poll by the U.S. State Department in seven Iraqi
cities found that thirty-seven percent of Iraqis with access to
satellite dishes preferred Al-Arabiya, twenty-six percent preferred
Al-Jazeera, and twelve percent preferred al-Iraqiya.8 6  When
efforts to compete with these new Arab sources failed, the
Department of Defense instead chose to eliminate the competition.
In September of 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council suspended Al-
Arabiya, the most popular television station in the country, from
reporting on official government activities for two weeks, after
accusing it of inciting violence against Council members and
Coalition personnel.87  In November 2003, the American
government ordered Al-Arabiya to suspend all of its operations in
Iraq after the channel broadcast a tape from Saddam Hussein. 88
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has described Al-Arabiya as
"violently anti-coalition."89 The new Iraqi government has also
condemned Al-Jazeera. 9°  Following a raid on the station's
85 See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 28.
86 Peter Feuilerade, Profile: Al-Arabiya TV, BBC NEWS, Nov. 25, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3236654.stm. With two-thirds of Iraq watching
Al-Jazeera and A1-Arabiya, perhaps it would be more frugal, effective, and legal to
convey American propaganda by buying broadcasting time on Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya. North, supra note 74.
87 Id. Al-Arabiya is a Dubai-based channel that was launched to compete with Al-
Jazeera. Its Iraq coverage angered American officials throughout the invasion. The
original two-week ban on A1-Arabiya followed the channel's broadcast of pictures of
masked men threatening to kill the American-appointed Iraqi governing council. A State
Department spokesman called the decision to air coverage of the men "irresponsible in
the extreme." See Feuilerade, supra note 86.
88 U.S. Accuses Two Popular Arab Networks of Working with Iraqi Insurgents,
ONLINE NEWSLETTER, Nov. 26, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media-watch/july-
dec03/arabnetworksI 1-26.html.
89 Id.
90 See MOHAMMED EL-NAWAWY & ADEL ISKANDAR, AL-JAZEERA (2002). Al-
Jazeera is a Qatar-based media outlet, largely funded by the Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin
Khalifa al-Thani. Prior to Al-Jazeera's creation, few Arabic-language news broadcasts
offered anything more substantial than state-directed propaganda. There were few true
news sources in the Middle East. In an attempt to fill the gap, Saudi-owned Orbit Radio
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Baghdad offices in fall 2004, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi
indefinitely closed the station.91 AI-Jazeera's controversial news
programming simultaneously attracts a large audience in Iraq and
the ire of every government in the Middle East and the United
States.92
The United States has joined the Arab world in accusing Al-
Jazeera of hostile and biased coverage.93 Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld called the network a "mouthpiece" for
terrorists.94 During an October 2001 meeting with the Emir of
Qatar, Secretary of State Colin Powell requested that the network
tone down its anti-American message. 95 In January 2005, the New
York Times reported that the Qatari government is considering
selling Al-Jazeera, as a result of pressure from the United States
and other governments.96 In November 2001, during the American
war against the Taliban, Al-Jazeera's Afghanistan bureau was
subjected to a stronger form of persuasion than State Department
and Television Service and the BBC's Arabic-language television division contracted to
form a television station. The new station rapidly gained a large audience, but was just
as quickly torn apart by the conflicting editorial influences of the Saudis and the BBC
staff. Al-Jazeera was created just as the BBC-Saudi venture disintegrated. It brought on
board nearly every former BBC staffer, as well as the independent and analytical attitude
they typified. See id.at 17-19.
91 Luke Harding, Iraq Extends Al-Jazeera Ban and Raids Offices, THE GUARDIAN,
Sept. 6, 2004, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,36041297865,00.html
#articlecontinue.
92 See WILLIAM A. RUGH, ARAB MASS MEDIA 232 (2004); see also EL-NAWAWY &
ISKANDAR, supra note 90, at 120. In 2000 Kuwait took legal action against Al-Jazeera.
A Kuwaiti court fined the station for slander following a program accusing Kuwaitis of
killing Palestinians and Iraqis with acid during the first Gulf War. See id. at 121. Egypt
has threatened to close Al-Jazeera's station there, but has not yet done so. See RUGH,
supra at 233. Morocco recalled its ambassador to Qatar in 2000, accusing Al-Jazeera of
"leading a 'hostile' campaign against its monarchy." EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra
note 90, at 124.
93 See RUGH, supra note 92, at 234.
94 Id.
95 Id. Western governments have also claimed that AI-Jazeera broadcasts were
being used by Al-Qaeda to pass along coded messages across the world. AI-Jazeera
Kabul Offices Hit in U.S. Raid, BBC NEWS, Nov. 13, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/l/hi/world/southasia/1653887.stm.
96 Steven R. Weisman, Under Pressure, Qatar May Sell Jazeera Station, NEW
YORK TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at 19. Though the Bush administration acknowledges that a
privately-owned AI-Jazeera might not be much of an improvement. See id. at 19.
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coaxing.97 The bureau was hit by an American missile during the
Afghan opposition forces' offensive in Kabul.98  During its
existence in Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera had sometimes been the only
news source with any access to the Taliban and the area they
controlled.99
The day before the fall of Baghdad, the then Iraqi information
minister, Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, protested what he considered
pro-American coverage: "I beg you [Al-Jazeera], do not play this
role."100  Al-Sahaf threatened the station's staff with "serious
consequences" if they continued their "pro-US reporting."'0 ' A
few days before the CPA-imposed ban on Al-Jazeera, the station
claimed to have received threats from an anti-U.S. resistance
movement. 102 The insurgents warned that if Al-Jazeera did not
stop its pro-American bias, then Baghdad-based A1-Jazeera
employees would become targets. 103
In March 2003 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
indefinitely revoked the accreditation of A1-Jazeera's reporters. 1°4
NYSE spokesman Ray Pellechina claimed that increased demand
for credentials was the motivating factor, but also admitted that
"security reasons" influenced the decision.' CNN reported that a
source at the NYSE cited Al-Jazeera's coverage of the war in Iraq
97 See Al-Jazeera Kabul Offices Hit in U.S. Raid, supra note 95.
98 See id.
99 See id. Al-Jazeera was able to scoop western media on several major stories,
including providing the only video footage of Afghanis setting fire to the American
Embassy in Kabul on September 26, 2001, live footage of the bombing of Kabul, and an
exclusive 1999 interview with Osama bin Laden. Id. See also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,
Brandenburg and the United States' War on Incitement Abroad: Defending a Double
Standard, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1009, 1010-11 (2002).
100 Ahmed Janabi, Iraq Silences Messenger AI-Jazeera, AL-JAZEERA ONLINE, Aug.
18, 2004, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A64DA6-E89F-4CD9-9370-0B224A
801E89.htm.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 See id.
104 Al-Jazeera TV Station Singled out in Ban by New York Stock Exchange,
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, March 26, 2003, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3
?id article=5409.
105 Parija Bhatnagar, Al Jazeera Ousted from NYSE, CNN MONEY, March 25, 2003,
http://money.cnn.com/2003/03/25/news/nyse-aljazeera/. See also Al-Jazeera TV Station
Singled out in Ban by New York Stock Exchange, supra note 102.
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as a motivating factor.'0 6  While the NYSE's actions were not
illegal, nor were a deadly threat to American freedom of the press,
it is alarming to see the actions taken against A1-Jazeera abroad
mirrored at home.
In his Brandenburg concurrence, Justice Brandis discussed the
potential harm of radical speech. Rather than answer radical
speech with "silence coerced by law," he preferred "reason applied
through public discussion. '"1' 7 The Brandenburg majority viewed
America as a diverse "marketplace of ideas," where the press
plays the critical role of providing a forum for speakers and
providing factual information. 10 8 It is true that Iraq, and the rest of
the Middle East, is not the ideal "marketplace of ideas" imagined
by the Brandenburg Court.'0 9 As Professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
argued, "[n]ot only are the 'evil counsels' common in Arab media
government-sponsored, but there are few voices willing and able
to correct them once they enter the marketplace of ideas."11 Most
Middle Eastern news sources are government-controlled, reporting
propaganda instead of news."1  The United States, however,
invaded Iraq in the hopes of creating a stable democracy in the
Middle East, not in the hopes of out-propagandizing every dictator
in the region.' 12
The U.S. government has denied Iraq the opportunity to evolve
a "marketplace of ideas."' 13 Even if the Brandenburg standard is
inapplicable in a country as dangerous and divided as Iraq, the
freedom of speech violations in Iraq fall short of international law
guaranteeslT and even Iraq's own laws. It is duplicitous of the
United States and the transitional Iraqi government to silence the
106 See Al Jazeera Ousted from NYSE, supra note 105.
107 See Lidsky, supra note 97, at 1015.
108 Id. at 1015.
109 See id. at 1016.
110 Id.
III See id.
112 "The goal is an Iraq that stands on its own feet and that governs itself in freedom
and in unity and with respect for the rights of all its citizens." Paul Wolfowitz,
Department of Defense Interview (April 1, 2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts
/2003+04032002-t0401 dsd60min.html.
113 See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
114 See infra Section IV.C (discussion of international freedom of press guarantees).
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two strongest dissenting voices in Iraq. President George W.
Bush, in a speech two months after the September 11 attacks, put
it best: "[e]very nation must have avenues for the peaceful
expression of opinion and dissent. When these avenues are closed,
the temptation to speak through violence grows."
'
" 
5
D. Contrast with the Communications Regulatory Agency in
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Commentators have argued that Brandenburg is not applicable
to Middle Eastern countries because they lack the secular society
and stable democracy fundamental to Brandenburg's notion of a
"marketplace of ideas" where inflammatory speech is
permissible.116 Professor Lidsky argues that the nature of Middle
Eastern society, with its "Islamic 'fundamentalist' movements,"
"unemployed and disaffected young people," and "dramatic
population growth and economic stagnation," is not conducive to
the application of the Brandenburg principles.117 This argument is
countered with the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where seven
years of stability have followed the creation of the
Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA). 18 This neutral body
controls Bosnian programming, while conforming to international
freedom of expression laws.1 9
115 Lidsky, supra note 97, at 1010.
116 See Lidsky, supra note 97, at 1028. Ironically, there may be a stronger
"marketplace of ideas" in Iraq than in Bosnia; see also North, supra note 74. North
praises Iraqi journalists,
although unschooled in the basic principles of democratic journalism, once they
realized it was OK to reasonably confront authority, they caught on fast. It was
in this geographic region that the first written words were recorded 5,000 years
ago and where the first laws, the Code of Hammurabi, were enacted. This
highly literate society hungers for intelligent communication and a responsible
media. There is a saying in the Middle East that Cairo writes, Beirut publishes,
and Baghdad reads.
North, supra note 72.
117 Lidsky, supra note 97, at 1028-29.
118 See generally Helena Mandi6, Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina-History and Ways Forward, CENTER ZA MEDIJSKO POLITIKO, Nov. 1,
2004, http://www.nirovni-institut.si/slo-html/rcmed-pol.htm. The CRA was originally
the "Independent Media Commission." Id.
119 See id.; see also North, supra note 72. North compares Bosnia and Iraq, "I have
trained journalists after the fall of tyrannies in Bosnia, Romania, and Afghanistan. I don't
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As nascent democracies, Bosnia and Iraq share several
overarching similarities and face similar challenges."O Bosnia, as
part of Yugoslavia, was under dictatorial control until the fall of
the Soviet Union.121  Bosnia-Herzegovina's secession from
Yugoslavia in 1991 was followed by several years of ethnic
conflict, ended by the 1995 Dayton Accords. 122 In 1995 and 1996,
the country was occupied by NATO peacekeeping troops. Like
Iraq, Bosnia is divided into regions with different ethnic
affiliations:123  Serbs comprise thirty-seven percent of the
population, Bosnians forty-eight percent, and Croats fourteen
percent. 124  Forty percent of the country is Muslim, thirty-one
percent Orthodox Christian, and fifteen percent Roman
Catholic. 125 The country is an assortment political parties. 126 Iraq,
in contrast, is seventy-five to eighty percent Arab and fifteen to
twenty percent Kurdish. 127  The country is sixty to sixty-five
percent Shi'a and thirty to thirty-seven percent Sunni. 128
The High Representative established the CRA in 1998.129 It
blame Iraqi journalists for the failure of IMN. They daily ignore serious threats branding
them 'American collaborators' and work for insufficient salaries." North, supra note 72.
120 See Leslie Gelb, The Three-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, at A27.
Gelb argues that Iraq be governed following the Yugoslavian model, splitting the
country into three different ethnic states: Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish. Id. He notes,
"[t]here is hopeful precedent for a three-state strategy: Yugoslavia after World War II."
Id. Tito united three ethnic groups to form Yugoslavia, but following his death in 1980,
several of the ethnic groups declared independence, leading to civil war. Id. According
to Gelb, "[t]he lesson is obvious: overwhelming force was the best chance for keeping
Yugoslavia whole, and even that failed in the end." Id.
121 See CIA World Factbook, Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.cia.gov/cia
/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html.
122 See id. (explaining that the country was divided into a Croat and Muslim region
(the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and a Serb region (the Republika Srpska)).
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See CIA World Factbook, Iraq, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
/geos/iz.html
128 Id.
129 Id. The Office of High Representative was created in the General Framework
Agreement for Peace. The High Representative is "appointed consistent with relevant
United Nations Security Council Resolutions." Id. He or she has authority for the civil
implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace. Id. The High
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licenses broadcasters, creates the rules they follow, and ensures
they adhere to these rules. 3 ° The CRA consists of a Council that
creates policy and serves as an appellate body, reviewing decisions
made by the head of the Independent Media Commission and its
Enforcement Panel. 13' The Council and the Enforcement Panel are
composed of Bosnian and international members, as is the
Enforcement Panel, which handles regulatory code breaches. 1
32
At the beginning of its existence, the Bosnian press did not
take the CRA's regulations very seriously; however, in the years
since it was created, the CRA has since involved the media in the
creation of the rules which has resulted in more consistent
adherence.'33 The Bosnian Broadcasting Code of Practice sets
forth a standard similar to the "clear and present danger" test.,
34
Broadcasters are banned from airing material which "carries a
clear and immediate risk" of inciting either "ethnic or religious
hatred ... or ... violence."' 13' There is also a ban on material that
"carries a clear and immediate risk of causing public harm," which
is defined as death, injury, property damage, or the diversion of
police or medical services.
136
Unlike Iraq's National Communication and Media
Commission (NCMC), the CRA does not "suggest or make
stations broadcast anything, such as coverage of present
government positions and statements."' 137  To do so would mean
that the CRA was "[sitepping out of its mandate and authority and
it would be lethal for everything that the CRA has achieved so far
in the field of media regulation and protection of journalist
Representative can delegate some responsibilities to commissions, as per Annex 10 of
the General Framework Agreement for Peace. See id.; see also General Framework
Agreement for Peace, Annex 10, Agreement on Civilian Implementation, 35 I.L.M. 75
(1996).
130 See Gelb, supra note 117, at 27.
131 Communications Regulatory Agency, http://www.cra.ba/en/about/?cid= 162.
132 See Mandi6, supra note 115, at 4.
133 Id.
134 See supra notes 13-15 and associated text.
135 Independent Media Commission, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Broadcasting Code of
Practice, http://www.ijnet.org/FE-Article/MediaLaw.asp?UILang= I &CID=25186.
136 Id.
137 See Mandi6, supra note 118, at 13.
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professionalism." 13 8 This would amount to censorship, which is
what the commission was created to prevent. 13
9
Complaints over programming content are referred to various
departments, and if there is sufficient evidence of illegal
programming, the Enforcement Panel will sanction the offender. 140
The Bosnian Broadcasting Code has been effective in the years
since its application.14 ' However, "many broadcasters still remain
firmly rooted to matters and political units within their own
[region] and issues concerning their own ethnicity."' 14 2  More
moderate broadcasters have been able to look to the CRA for help
to resist the pressures of biased journalism, and this is perhaps the
CRA's most important contribution to the Bosnian media
landscape. CRA decisions are available to the public through press
releases and on their website. 43  The CRA does not tell
broadcasters what they must air, and it does not force them to give
airtime to certain groups."
IV. Prosecuting Freedom of Speech Violations in American
Courts
A. International Law in U.S. Courts and Beyond
When evaluating the strength of a lawsuit against the
American government or American contractors for their actions in
Iraq, the first and most important question is whether any law has
been violated. Three main sources of law are relevant: Iraqi law,
American law, and international law. Iraq's instability makes a
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See id. at 8-9. Sanctions range from a warning to the termination of broadcast
license. They are proportionate to the severity of the breach.
141 See id. ("The application of simple, broad and common sense articles has readily
adapted to differing political climates involving elections, war and the largest Balkan
peace conference in fifty years.").
142 Id. Out of 278 stations, 60 have been subject to disciplinary action. Each of the
278 stations has undergone a licensing review by the CRA. In a point-system
assessment, each station had to prove its financial viability, prior compliance with the
Independent Media Commission Rules, as well as demonstrating the qualifications of
program value and technical standard. Mandi6, supra note 115, at 9.
143 See id. at 10.
144 See id. at 9.
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domestic lawsuit on the subject unlikely. 45  Hampered by weak
mandates and a lack of funding, few international tribunals
effectively address human rights laws. Of the three options, most
likely to produce a substantial remedy is a tort action in American
courts for freedom of press violations in Iraq. If such a case could
be tried in American courts, international law would still play a
crucial role. Therefore, this section addresses the applicability of
relevant American and international laws.
The 2004 Supreme Court decision Sosa v. Alzarez-Machain
highlighted the possibility of a remedy in American courts for a
tort committed in violation of "the law of nations." 146 This part of
the Comment examines the facets of such an action for freedom of
speech violations in Iraq. Section A introduces the concept of a
violation of "the law of nations," a crime so severe that it is
actionable in foreign courts. Section B addresses the two
American laws that extend jurisdiction to such torts, the Alien Tort
Claims Act, and the Torture Victim Prevention Act. Section C
contains a more in-depth analysis of exactly what crimes
constitute violations of the "law of nations." Section D analyzes
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
would prove critical to any attempt to prove that freedom of press
violations in Iraq violate the "law of nations." Section E explores
the most analogous case to the focus of this comment, Tachiona v.
Mugabe, a claim brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act for a
denial of free speech in a foreign country.
Some human rights obligations are recognized as being "owed
... to the whole international community."'47 These obligations
have resulted in the evolution of a concept of universal
jurisdiction.148  The International War Crimes Tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the International Criminal Tribunals for
145 Iraqi law is still relevant, however. As will be shown later in this Comment [need
an internal cross-reference], American courts reference foreign laws when hearing
extraterritorial suits.
146 See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 722 (2004).
147 See M. Shah Alam, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law by
Domestic Courts, 2, The Association of American Law Schools, http://www.aals.org
/international2004/Papers/alam.pdf.
148 See The Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, The Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction, Jan. 7, 2005, http://www.law.uc.edu/morgan/newsdir/univjuris
.html.
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Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court are
examples of international courts with jurisdiction that reaches
beyond the boundaries of the nations that create them. 149 Another
example is the extradition of former Chilean dictator General
Augusto Pinochet following his arrest in Great Britain per a
Spanish judge's extradition request. 5 ° The judge included in his
request an account of the torture, genocide, and "disappearances"
inflicted during Pinochet's rule on Spaniards living in Chile and
on Chileans who since moved to Spain.'5 The Spanish judge
claimed that the disappearances, torture, and genocide, which are
all recognized in international law, triggered international criminal
responsibility.'52 In the end, British Home Secretary Jack Straw
decided not to grant the extradition request. However, he
indicated that this was not because of concerns over the
misapplication of international law, stating that "the only factor"
in his decision was "[Pinochet's] health, and in particular his
mental fitness to stand trial."' 3
There are both domestic and international forums for redress
of human rights violations. Some international conventions even
provide recourse in domestic courts.'54 Some Eastern European
149 Chris McMorran, War Crime Tribunals, BEYOND RETRACTABILITY,
http://www.beyondretractability.org/m/int war-crimetribunals.jsp.
150 Richard Blystone, Pinochet Case a Defining Moment for International Law,
CNN NEWS, Nov. 24, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe)9811/24/pionchet.legalities/.
151 The Pinochet Case: Timeline, BBC NEWS, July 13, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/americas/1209914.stm.
152 Amnesty Intemational.org, Pinochet Case: Extradition Proceedings for Torture
Charges Must Go Ahead, April 7, 1999, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur
450191999?open&of=eng-385. "Disappearances" are recognized as torture under
several United Nations Declarations, the Inter-American Convention, and in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Id.
153 Straw's Statement in Full, BBC NEWS, Mar. 2, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/i/hi/uk_politics/663444.stm. On November 30, 2004, the Chilean President had
proposed pensions and reparations for more than 28,000 Chileans who were tortured
during Pinochet's reign. The Spanish attempt to extradite the dictator in Spain is seen as
one of the catalysts for the movement in Chile that culminated in the reparations. See The
Pinochet Case, supra note 151. See Tom Burgis, Chile's Torture Victims to Get Life
Pensions, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Nov. 30, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk
/intemational/story/0,, 1362485,00.htnl.]
154 See Alam, supra note 147, at 3 ("European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms recognizes the right of the individuals to have recourse to
domestic courts in case of infringement of their rights provided for in the Convention
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countries directly adopt international human rights law as the law
applicable in their court system. On the other hand, the United
States Supreme Court in its Paquete Habana decision.. ruled that
"customary international law is 'part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination." 56
Theoretically, self-executing international agreements supersede
all earlier inconsistent federal, state, and local laws, though not the
Constitution.'57 Therefore, international agreements have found
their way into the American judicial system as sources of law. In
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 58 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Alien Torts Claims Act 5 9
"establishes cause of action for violations of international law but
requiring the district court to perform a traditional choice-of-law
analysis to determine whether international law, law of forum
state, or law of state where events occurred should provide
substantive law in such an action." '1
60
B. The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim
Prevention Act
The aforementioned Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) was part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. While mainly written to grant
district courts jurisdiction over acts of piracy, the ATCA has since
been expanded to include some modern tort claims. 16' The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, found that:
deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority
(Art. 13).").
155 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
156 Id.
157 See id. However, in practice international law might not provide a remedy if
superseded by any one of a number of doctrines (including the act of the state doctrine,
the political question doctrine, sovereign immunity, and forum non conveniens).
158 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d. Cir. 2000).
159 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
160 Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) as holding in dictum that
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1984) should be construed as such).
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
161 See, e.g., Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88.
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violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus,
whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process
by an alien within our borders, the [ATCA] provides federal
jurisdiction. 162
The Filartiga appellants were Paraguayan citizens challenging
the dismissal of their complaint that a Paraguayan official
wrongfully tortured and killed their family member. The case was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the appeals
court found that the ATCA met the three requirements for
jurisdiction in an American court: (1) the claim was made by
aliens (2) in tort, and (3) the tort was in violation of the law of
nations or treaties of the United States. 163 A specific "right to sue"
in the law of nations is not necessary, all that is necessary is a
showing that the defendant's actions violated the law of nations.164
However, because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
ATCA may only apply to "private, nongovernmental acts." 165 The
1995 Second Circuit decision of Kadic v. Karadizic evinces that
the ATCA covers the conduct of "private parties provided that
their conduct is undertaken under the color of state authority or
violates a norm of international law that is recognized as extending
to the conduct of private parties." 166
The Torture Victim Prevention Act (hereinafter "TVPA") was
enacted in 1991, ostensibly to codify Filartiga's interpretation of
the ATCA. 167 The TVPA explicitly recognized what was implicit
in the ATCA: that customary international law has been
162 See Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 76.
163 See id.; Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(asserting that the law of nations refers to "customary international law," derived from
"the customs and usages of civilized nations").
164 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
decision was divided on this point, as Judge Bork's opinion held that a specific right to
sue was necessary. Id. at 389.
165 Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206-07.
166 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 104 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40, 245 (2d
Cir. 1995)). As the ATCA was passed in 1789, there is little record of the original
legislative intent behind the law. Currently, Filartiga stands as the definitive
interpretation of the law, allowing claims for international human rights abuses occurring
abroad. Id.
167 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000); see also Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 104.
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incorporated into United States law, and that "a violation of the
international law of human rights is (at least with regard to torture)
ipso facto a violation of U.S. domestic law."'' 68 The statute gives
American district courts original jurisdiction over "any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."'' 69  The tort must be a
violation of the law of nations, not just a violation of the law of the
applicable sovereign state. 7 ° It is the court's responsibility to
determine whether such a tort has occurred by examining
international law. 7' The TVPA extends liability to any person,
whether an American citizen or not, who subjects another person
(regardless of whether this person is an American citizen) to
torture or extrajudicial killing. 172  Before seeking redress in
American courts, the claimant must exhaust all other remedies in
the place where the torture or extrajudicial killing occurred.173 The
TVPA is exceptional in that it applies to non-U.S. citizens harmed
by non-U.S. citizens outside the United States. 174 It extends the
reach of American law and brings human rights violations
occurring under the direction of the leadership of foreign countries
within the jurisdiction of American courts. 175
However, the TVPA and ATCA are not a perfect fit for the
instant situation. The TVPA is limited in scope to "shockingly
egregious violations of universally recognized principles of
international law."' 176 The third requirement for bringing a claim
under the TVPA is that the tort be a violation of the "law of
nations." Unfortunately, the law of nations does not include
private, non-state actions. 17' Nor are First Amendment rights
168 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105.
169 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Note that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act generally
supersedes the TVPA. Id.
170 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (U.S.D. 1984).
171 See id. at 862-63.
172 See id. at 861.
173 See id. at 864.
174 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
175 See id.
176 Mendoca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (E.D. La. 2001) (quoting
Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983)).
177 See id.
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recognized under the law of nations.'78 Moreover, the Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan'79 court dismissed a complaint based on the
ATCA, not because the plaintiffs were misusing the Act, but
because it was improper to seek judicial relief against military
actions approved by the President. In such a situation, a political
solution may be more appropriate.
Several other U.S. laws address the extraterritorial reach of
American courts. The Act of State Doctrine directs courts not to
examine the legality of a public act of a recognized foreign
sovereign when committed within its own territory. 8 ° However,
the doctrine does not require courts to decline jurisdiction, it
simply prevents courts from deciding the merits of certain
matters. 181 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grants foreign
states and their agents limited immunity from the jurisdiction of
American courts. 182 Of interest is the fact that the statute adds that
"[n]o action shall be maintained under this action if an official,
employee, or agent of the United States, while acting within the
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency would not be
liable for such acts if carried out within the United States."'183 The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is recognized as being the sole
means by which jurisdiction can be established.' Generally,
foreign nations are immune from suit in the United States for
"non-commercial, 'public' acts," unless the case meets an
exception in the act. 85  American officials, meanwhile, are
178 Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D.Cal. 1986) ("However dearly our
country holds First Amendment rights ... a violation of the First Amendment right of
free speech does not rise to the level of such universally recognized rights and so does
not constitute a 'law of nations."'). Guinto was a claim by Philippine citizens against the
Philippine government.
179 The Sanchez plaintiffs were citizens and non-citizens, alleging various military
violations of human rights laws in Nicaragua. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770
F.2d 202, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
180 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789.
181 Id.
182 U.S.C.S. § 1604 (2003). Exceptions where there is no immunity include
commercial activity, as per international law, and suits in admiralty. See id. at § 1605.
Additionally, immunity is not granted in regards to state-sponsored terrorism. Id.
183 Id. § 1604(f).
184 See generally Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 428-29 (1989).
185 Id.
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immune from suits over constitutional protections unless their
actions are part of a larger "custom, policy, or practice or, in the
case of other constitutional standards, demonstrate . . . reckless
disregard or deliberate indifference for human life."' 18 6 These rules
would not preclude a freedom of speech claim, as the U.S.
invasion of Iraq should fall under the "policy" exception to the
general rule of government immunity.
C. Jus Cogens and Customary International Law
The ATCA, as enacted in 1789, provides federal courts with
"original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."' 8 7 But what constitutes a violation of the law of
nations? An examination of the different types of binding
international law may provide the answer. There is a continuum
of international laws, from jus cogens laws, which supposedly
trump all other laws, to customary laws, which are less frequently
enforced.188  The term jus cogens refers to a preemptory set of
norms in international law which prevail over other forms of
international law.189 Violations of such norms are recognized as
illegal, even if the nation that committed the violation is not a
party to any treaty or agreement outlawing the act.' 90 The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that the norm be
"accepted and recognized by the international community."' 9' The
United Nations has clarified that a "very large majority" of states,
with a "very small number of states" dissenting, is sufficient to
186 See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
187 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
188 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(k) (1987).
189 Id. The principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force are
of ajus cogens nature.
190 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1968, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332). The Vienna Convention defines ajus cogens norm as "a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character." Id.
191 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, at 32.
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create a norm. 192  The lower court in Tachiona v. Mugabe
conducted a similar inquiry into what constitutes a breach of the
law of nations. The District Court listed cruel or inhuman
treatment or punishment, genocide, slavery, disappearances,
torture, arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and
"a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of internationally
recognized human rights" as wrongs recognized in customary
international law. 93 All but the "consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights," are jus
cogens violations. 9 4 Therefore, according to the Restatement of
Foreign Relations, these norms "are not subject to derogation in
times of emergency."195
International laws are continually evolving. Over time, state
practice can become recognized as a custom, an unwritten but
enforceable law. 196  These customs may one day become jus
cogens norms. 97 Therefore an examination of customary law on
freedom of speech may shed light on the law of nations. There is
no uniform definition of customary international law. 198 One
possible definition from Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice "refers to international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law."' 99 Non-binding
resolutions, "declarations of principles," and international
conferences are sources of customary law.200 Customary law is
traditionally not binding on a state which indicated its dissent
during the development of the law, and dissent is fairly
common.20 ' In American courts, customary law is invoked "where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
192 See id.
193 See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
194 See id.
195 Id.
196 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
197 See id.
198 RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, at 5-6.
199 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, art. 38, (1)(b).
200 Id.
201 See id. Instances of refusal to abide by customary law after its development are
rare, however. Id.
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judicial decision., 20 2
There are several possible sources of customary law. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become a
"cornerstone of customary international law. 20 3 It was created by
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.204 However, the
declaration is non-binding, and thus does not create a private right
to action in American courts.2 5 It is "a common standard of
achievement," and aspires towards a minimum standard of
freedom of the press.20 6 Article 19 states that "[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.', 20 7 This freedom is "subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society., 20 8  The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also significant in that it
is incorporated into the Iraqi Interim Broadcasting Code of
Practice, which states, "[b]roadcasters' freedom of access to
information and their freedom to publish should conform to
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2 °9
While the Geneva Convention denotes states with minimum
202 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900)).
203 See National Coordinating Committee for UDHR50, Eleanor Roosevelt,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1998), http://www.udhr.org/historyABiographies
/bioer.htm.
204 See id.; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
A/RES/217/1 (Dec. 10, 1948). United Nations member states were encouraged instead
to "cause [the text] to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in
schools and other educational institutions"; see also Standard-setting and
Implementation, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/intro.htm.
205 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 199, at Preamble.
206 Id.
207 Id. art. 19.
208 Id. art. 29, 2.
209 NCMC Code and Discussion, supra note 42, at 3
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standards of conduct applicable during declared and undeclared
wars, it does not contain any freedom of speech protections.210 It
is applicable in "all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by
one of them.",211 Unfortunately, it does not contain provisions for
the protection of freedom of expression during a conflict.2 12
Article 53 of the convention prohibits "any destruction by the
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively to private persons . . . except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.,, 213  Article 53 explores an intriguing facet of the
freedom of press violations in Iraq, the destruction of personal
property. However, the Geneva Convention lacks any more
significant law on the subject.1 4
D. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant) addresses two potential uses in addressing the freedom
of press violations occurring in Iraq. First, the Covenant has been
cited in past ATCA actions, and has provided American courts
with insight into what constitutes a violation of the law of
nations. 215 The Covenant may also provide an international
solution to the violations occurring in Iraq. Based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 16 the Covenant has
provisions by which human rights claims can be investigated.217
The Covenant was "based on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." It was ratified by the United Nations General Assembly
210 See generally Fourth Geneva Convention.
211 Fourth Geneva Convention art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 287.
212 See id.
213 Id. art. 53.
214 See Fourth Geneva Convention supra note 5, art. 2.
215 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 794 (1996).
216 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at
52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966).
217 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, T 4, Dec. 19, 1966,
999, U.N.T.S. 171.
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in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.218 Iraq is a signatory to the
Convenant, but the United States, while a signatory, has not yet
ratified the Covenant. 2 9  Article 19 of the Covenant contains
provisions for the protection of freedom of the press.2 20  It
guarantees:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in form of art, or through any
other media of his choice. (3) The exercise of the rights
provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law
and are necessary.. . for the protection of national security or of
public order (order public), or of public health or morals.22'
The Covenant's protections can be weakened during times of
war, as long as the proper notification procedure is followed.222
Article 4 of the Covenant allows "measures derogating from [the]
obligations [of the Covenant] in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed . . .. , A state that seeks the right to
derogate must "immediately inform the other States Parties to the
present Covenant., 224  The state must also notify the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and explain which provisions were
derogated and why.22 1
A Human Rights Committee (Committee) monitors the
enforcement of the Covenant. 6  It consists of eighteen human
rights experts, elected by member states, who meet three times a
218 Id., art. 9.
219 See Signatures to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Human Rights Web, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cprsigs.html.
220 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 217, art. 19.
221 Id.
222 Id. art. 4.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 212, art. 28.
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year.227 They review annual reports submitted by the signatory
states, reporting their progress towards implementation of the
covenant's goals. 228  The Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights gives the Committee the
229task of reviewing complaints of Covenant violations. When an
individual in a Covenant member state claims to be suffering from
a Covenant violation and has exhausted all domestic remedies, he
or she may submit a complaint to the Committee. The
Committee will inform the member state of the alleged violation,
after which the state has six months to reply with an explanation
either clarifying the issue or detailing the remedy. 23' After
reviewing the communications, the Committee reaches a decision
behind closed doors and sends a response to the individual and the
state whose policy is at issue.232
Under Article 41, a state party to the Covenant may also
request that the Committee hear a claim that another state party is
not working towards enforcement of the Covenant's provisions. 3
The complaining state must give the accused state notice;
however, if the matter is not settled within six months, either state
can refer the matter to the Committee.234 Within twelve months,
the Conmmittee will submit a report with the hopes of detailing a
solution.235 If it is unable to resolve the issue, with consent of the
states involved, the Committee may appoint a Conciliation
Commission. 236 The Conciliation Commission has twelve months
to release a statement detailing a potential solution.237
While the Covenant suggests specific and strong remedies that
227 Id. art. 28, 1-2. The members come from states that are parties to the covenant,
and make a declaration of impartiality before taking office. Id. art. 28, T 2, art. 38.
228 Id. art. 40.
229 Human Rights Web, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr-prot.html.
230 Id. art. 2.
231 Id. art. 2-5.
232 Id. art. 5.
233 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 212, art. 41, 1.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. art. 42, T 1.
237 Id.
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should exist for individuals wronged by their states, it is limited in
its enforcement capabilities.238 Most Covenant member states
have ratified the Optional Protocol, but neither Iraq nor the United
States have done So. 23 9 The United States ratified the Covenant in
1992, reaffirming a strong commitment to human rights abroad. In
urging ratification from the Senate floor, Senator Pell remarked
that "the rights guaranteed by the covenant are the cornerstones of
a democratic society. By ratifying the covenant now, we have an
opportunity to promote democratic rights and freedoms and the
rule of law ... [in] areas where democracy is taking hold., 240
However, the U.S. Senate added a number of reservations, which
limited the enforceability of the document.241  The Senate's
resolution contained a provision which declared that " provisions
of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.
242
The United States, however, did accept the Human Rights
Committee's authority to deal with the complaints of one state
against another, as granted in Article 41 .243 The Senate also noted
that several of the Covenant's provisions were not as strong as
United States law requires. 2' The Senate included as a reservation
that "Article 47 may be exercised only in accordance with
international law., 24
5
Most significantly, the Senate took pains to point out that the
Covenant neither "requires [nor] authorizes" the United States to
238 See id. art. 9, 4-5 ("Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is
not lawful," and "[alnyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.").
239 See generally Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights
Treaties, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004),
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
240 138 CONG. REc. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
241 See generally id.
242 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. Article 47 of the Covenant reads, "Nothing in the present Covenant shall be
interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and
freely their natural wealth and resources." International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 204, art. 47.
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take any action prohibited by the Constitution. 46 The Senate
advised that member states that are parties to the Covenant
"should wherever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions
or limitations on the exercise of the rights recognized and
protected by the [C]ovenant, even when such restrictions and
limitations are permissible under the terms of the Covenant., 24 7 It
is a testament to the importance of freedom of speech and freedom
of press in the United States that one of the few rights which they
did not reign in was freedom of expression.248 The United States
declared that it would continue to adhere to the requirements and
constraints of its Constitution in respect to all such restrictions and
limitations., 249  The Senate added the further restriction that
"Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action
by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech...
protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 25°
Congress did not implement the Covenant with legislation;
furthermore, since the Senate declared the list of political and civil
rights contained in Articles 1-27 to be non-self-executing, no
private right of action was created by the Covenant.25  This does
not render the treaty completely useless. Even though the rights
within the covenant are non-self-executing, the United States is
still a party state for the purposes of investigation by the
Committee. 2
Congress did not create any reservations weakening the United
States' conmmitment to the freedom of speech or the press.253
246 138 CONG. REc. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. The Covenant states that "[t]here shall be no. . . derogation from any of the
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present
Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the
present Covenant does not recognize such rights .... " International Covenant for Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 212, at art. 5, 12.
250 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
251 See id.; see also Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721 (Cal. 1952) (holding that
the United Nations Charter would not provide relief for the appellant, because it was not
a self-executing treaty and therefore would not trump state law, as treaties in Article VI
of the Constitution are said to). U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
252 See 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
253 Id.
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While nitpicking and derogating from some Covenant protections,
the Senate met and exceeded the covenant's freedom of expression
demands.254 Though the Senate's actions will not change the fact
that the Covenant is not enforceable as a treaty in American
courts, it is significant to note the importance that Congress places
on freedom of press guarantees.
Case law arising from the Covenant further expands its
usefulness. In Kazi v. Dubai Petroleum Co., the Texas Supreme
Court held that the Covenant confers "equal treaty rights" between
India and the United States because they are states party to the
Covenant. 255 Texas law uses the concept of "equal treaty rights" to
confer the right to sue.256 It "condition[s] a foreign citizen's right
to sue on personal injury or death claims on the right of a United
States citizen, grounded in a treaty, to go into the courts of the
decedent or injured party's country of citizenship and .. pursue
[a similar] claim ... 257 To prove the existence of "equal treaty
rights," a plaintiff must show that the opposing side's country is
party to a treaty guaranteeing American citizens equal access to
the foreign country's courts.25 8 This provision can be implied or
explicit. 9
Article 19 of the Covenant has only been addressed in one
American court case, Tachiona v. Mugabe, which is discussed
later in this Comment.26 ° However, Article 19 has been the subject
of a number of Committee decisions.26' In Aduayom v. Togo the
254 Id. The United States reserves the right to treat juveniles as adults, despite the
reference made in Article 10 paragraph 2(b) and 3 and Article 14, paragraph 4; "the
United States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of Article 15";
discriminations in a time of public emergency based "solely" on race, color, etc. "do not
bar distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular
status."
255 Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W. 3d 71, 77 (Tex. 2000).
256 See id.
257 Id. at 80; see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (a)(3) (2005).
258 Dubai Petroleum Co., 12 S.W. 3d at 80.
259 Id.
260 Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd,
Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). Tachiona was reversed on
grounds entirely unrelated to the Article 19 issue, and the district court's Article 19 dicta
has not been rejected by a higher court. Id.
261 Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
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Committee ruled in favor of a group of authors who were fired
from their jobs for distributing political pamphlets against the
government of Togo.262 In HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu the Committee
found that a defendant's conviction for defacing a flag during a
peaceful demonstration violated Article 19.263
The Article 19 guarantees of freedom of expression are most
significantly limited by the need to maintain "public order.
264
This provision may further limit the usefulness of the Covenant.
There is no reliable definition of "public order" available.265 In the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the term "public order" is
possibly understood to mean "the conditions that assure the
normal and harmonious functioning of institutions based on a
coherent system of values and principles. 266 Unfortunately, the
United States has signed, but not ratified, the American
Convention of Human Rights, and so has not added any
jurisprudence on the subject of the meaning of "public order"
within the context of that agreement. 267 Federal and state case law
contain only a few references to the term "public order" as it
appears in the Covenant, and only Tachiona v. Mugabe even
addresses the appropriate situations when suspensions of freedom
of expression could occur.268
262 Id.
263 HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, 6 B.H.R.C. 591 (C.A. 1999). But see Ross v. Canada,
10 B.H.R.C. 219 (U.N.H.R. Comm. 2000) (where the Committee found that the state
suitably demonstrated that their interference with freedom of expression met the Article
19 standards). However, Committee decisions are not binding on Covenant signatories.
In HKSAR, the Committee's views were ignored and the conviction of the flag burner
was upheld on appeal. HKSAR, 6 B.H.R.C. at 591.
264 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 212, at art.
19.
265 See Report of the Working Group of Intergovernmental Experts on the Human
Rights of Migrants, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1998/16 (Mar. 9, 1999), United Nations Economic and Social Council,
http://www.smc.org.ph/rights/experts.htm.
266 See The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Compulsory Membership in an
Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion, 25 I.L.M. 123 (ser. A)
No.5, T 64 (Nov. 13), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Volume%20111a.htm.
267 Reed Brody, America's Problem with Human Rights, http://www.twnside.org.sg
/title/1 893-cn.htm.
268 See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428 (S.D.N.Y 2002). But see
Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (overturning Tachiona v. United
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Realistically, the Covenant's provisions on freedom of
expression do not create a private right of action in American
courts for Americans or citizens of foreign countries. The United
States specified that Article 19 is not self-executing, and Congress
has not enacted legislation implementing either agreement.269
Thus, not only did the Covenant fail to create a private right of
action in the United States, but the recommendations of the
Committee are non-binding. 27 ° At most, American courts have
found the Committee's guidance "most important," or found the
Committee's interpretation of an Article helpful.271
E. Tachiona v. Mugabe
27 2
As the only case before an American court to address the
Covenant's Article 19 protections, the Tachiona case is
particularly instructive in a tort action for freedom of speech
violations in Iraq. The Tachiona plaintiffs, all Zimbabweans,
brought suit under the ATCA against Zimbabwe's ruling party, the
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF),
and several of its officers, including Stan Mudenge and Robert
Mugabe." 3  They claimed that the defendants denied them
political freedoms, including their right to freedom of expression,
as guaranteed by the Covenant.274 Tachiona v. Mugabe might
foster a precedent for recoveries under the ATCA for violations of
the Covenant's guarantees of freedom of expression .2' The case
has been overturned on appeal, based not on the applicability of
the ATCA but on the diplomatic immunity the defendants
States, 386 F. 3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004)).
269 Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F. 3d 337, 393 (6th Cir. 2001).
270 See id.; see also Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001).
271 See United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998); see also United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
272 Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
273 See id. at 405. Robert Mugabe was both president of ZANU-PF and president of
Zimbabwe at all relevant times, and Stan Mudenge was Zimbabwe's foreign minister
and a ZANU-PF officer. Id.
274 See id. at 430-31. The plaintiffs' attempts at free speech and political action
were met with severe human rights violations, including torture and extrajudicial
killings. Id.
275 See id. at 422.
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enjoyed.276
The Tachiona I court was faced with a choice of law decision
between American, Zimbabwean, and international laws. The
Tachiona I court refers to the diverging opinions of Judge Bork
and Judge Edwards in the Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
decision.27 7 The Tel-Oren court recognized a right to sue, but did
not explicitly state whether the right of action derived from
international law, federal law, or local law.278 Judge Bork
described international law as an instrument used to "merely
enunciate in expansive generalities particular principles,
aspirations and ideals . ... ,,27' He describes internationally
recognized human rights as so general that traditional courts
cannot apply them for adjudicatory purposes.280  In Bork's
opinion, human rights norms had not ripened in customary
international law so as to create causes of action.28' Judge
Edwards, meanwhile, pondered a possible solution to the daunting
choice of law question a domestic court might face.282 He
suggested that litigation brought under the ATCA should assert
rights of actions based on American tort laws, as long as there is
an alleged violation of international law.283
The 1984 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala decision signified the re-
emergence of the nearly two hundred year old ATCA.284 When
hearing Filartiga, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Paraguayan law must be applied because the parties were residents
276 See id.; see also Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
277 See Tachiona, 234 F.Supp.2d at 408. The three judges hearing the case-Judges
Bork, Edwards, and Robb-all concurred in separate opinions, with different views on
the case.
278 See id. at 409-11.
279 Id. at 409.
280 See id.
281 See id. at 410.
282 See id. at 411.
283 See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F.Supp.2d at 411. The order of choice of law that
has developed in the jurisdictions that have dealt with ATCA is as follows: (1) federal
common law, (2) law of the forum state, (3) law of the foreign jurisdiction most affected,
(4) international law. Id.
284 See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). As
such, it is useful to any analysis of the ATCA.
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of Paraguay when the events in question occurred.285 Filartiga
created a precedent of referring to "the full range of available
decisional guides and sources. 286 In Filartiga, the Second Circuit
addressed whether the ATCA covers "a wrong 'in violation of the
law of nations' or merely a wrong actionable under the law of the
appropriate sovereign state. ' 287 Judge Nicherson concluded that
the local laws of a foreign state were relevant, but only "to the
extent they do not inhibit the appropriate enforcement of the
applicable international law or conflict with the public policy of
the United States. 288  This analysis would be fortuitous for a
freedom of expression claim brought over events in Iraq, since
American freedom of speech law provides arguably the most
generous standard in the world.289
Since the Filartiga decision, case law has developed standards
to guide choice of law decisions. 290 The laws of the state where
the wrong occurred, and where the parties reside, may apply
insofar as they are consistent with federal law and international
law, providing remedies compatible with the ATCA and
customary international law.29' If the local law of the foreign
country conflicts with international or American law, or does not
provide a substantive remedy, an appropriate remedy may be
created by drawing on analogous federal and forum state law
principles.292 If drawing on federal or forum state law will
inappropriately prevent remedy, then the court may look to
municipal law from the foreign country.293 Lastly, if international
law does not apply to the claim, the foreign country's municipal
law can be used as per the federal court's pendent jurisdiction.294
285 See id.; see also Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n. 15.
286 See Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 413.
287 See id. at 412.
288 See id.
289 The United States foreign policy towards freedom of speech is more favorable
and forceful than the American take on many other internationally recognized human
rights. See 138 CONG. REc. S4781, 4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
290 See Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
291 See id.
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See id. at 419.
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In the 1995 decision Xunacx v. Gramajo, the plaintiffs, a group
of aliens and an American citizen, successfully brought a claim of
torture, assault, and false imprisonment against a Guatemalan
public official.295 The district court relied on the doctrine that
where federal legislation creates a cause of action without
clarifying specific details, the courts should look for a state law
that is analogous and will not defeat the purposes of the federal
law.2 96 On the issue of whether a sibling can sue under the ATCA,
the Xunacx court applied TVPA and Guatemalan law, rather than
relying on a decision in a case in the forum state which would
have denied the sibling the right to sue.2 97
There are several practical and policy reasons why American
law is preferrable over the law of a foreign state when bringing
international tort claims. Like many international laws, the laws
of foreign states are frequently written in general, vague, and un-
enforceable terms. 298 Local laws in foreign countries may have the
same weight as a non-self-executing treaty: lofty human rights
goals, without a private right of action or any enforcement
mechanism.2 99 Countries without a strong tradition of the rule of
law may lack the legal system necessary to reach credible
decisions on human rights issues.3°° This is especially true in
countries like Iraq, which have been subject to the unconditional
and inconsistent rule of a dictator. Also, in many of the claims
brought for international human rights violations in American
courts, the very officials who control the courts of the foreign
nation are the ones charged.3 ' According to the court, the local
laws of foreign countries "may not be available or may lag behind
the need in providing adequate or readily accessible remedies to
redress universally recognized wrongs. 3 °2  The court also
295 See generally Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
296 See Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 413.
297 See id.; see also Rule of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2004) ("The laws of
the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."). Id.
298 See Tachiona, 234 F.Supp. 2d at 412-13.
299 See id. at 416.
300 See id. at 414.
301 See id. at 415.
302 See id. at 416.
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recognized that foreign officials may improperly claim immunity
as government officials, perverting the purpose behind sovereign
immunity.3 3
The Tachiona I court rejected the argument that it was
necessary to reign in political freedoms in the instant situation.
The court held that "there [was] no evidence ... of the existence
of any public emergency officially proclaimed, or any necessity of
national security or public order. ' '3°4 The district court found that
since there was a similar basis for recovery under American law
based on the First Amendment, they were entitled to compensation
under the ATCA.0 5
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit addressed whether the ATCA
covers "a wrong 'in violation of the law of nations' or merely a
wrong actionable under the law of the appropriate sovereign
state."30 6  Judge Nicherson concluded that the local laws of a
foreign state are relevant, but only "to the extent they do not
inhibit the appropriate enforcement of the applicable international
law or conflict with the public policy of the United States. 3 7 The
United States domestic policy towards freedom of speech is more
favorable and forceful than the American take on many other
internationally recognized human rights.3" 8
The Tachiona I court recognized a gray area between the
dichotomy of a "binding treaty" and a "non-binding
pronouncement."'  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
for example, fell into this gray area.310 In contrast with Guinto v.
Marcos,3 1' the Tachiona I court held that the Covenant actually
established some personal freedoms as jus cogens preemptory
303 See id. at 414; see also Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS ix-x (Columbia
University Press ed., 1990) (noting that the idea of international human rights is "at best
formal, nominal, perhaps even hypocritical, and cynical").
304 See Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
305 Id. at 435. But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (limiting the
ATCA's applicability to more extreme human rights violations).
306 Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 412.
307 Id.
308 138 CONG. REC. S4781,4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
309 Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
310 Id.
311 Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.Cal. 1986).
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norms.3 12 The personal freedoms are limited only so far as the
Covenant curtails them to maintain public safety.3" 3 Freedom of
expression is subject to more specific limitations than most other
human rights guarantees in the Covenant, and the Tachiona I court
held that since its guarantees are more highly structured, it may be
ordered on a higher plane on the scale of universal acceptance
and definition, and thus vested with a higher grade of protection,
than associational and participatory rights such as freedom of
association, assembly and political participation in government,
each of which is subject to many more practical constraints
associated with other public imperatives.31 4
The Tachiona I court distinguishes limitations placed on the
exercise of rights of peaceful assembly and association with
freedom of expression.31 5  Limits on the former must be
"'necessary' in connection with the specified public purposes,"
while limits on the latter must be "necessary to 'protect' public
safety, order, health or morals. 3 16 The Covenant subjects rights of
participation in politics to an even looser standard.31 7 Restrictions
on political participation simply must not be "unreasonable.,
318
According to the Tachiona I court, the United States Supreme
Court has also recognized the fundamental importance of freedom
of expression.3 9  The Supreme Court describes freedom of
expression as "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly
every other form of freedom., 320 The district court's decision in
Tachiona I rings true: the court viewed freedom of expression as
the most fundamental American freedom, found international law
extolling the importance of freedom of expression, and thus chose
to hear a case concerned with the protection of that freedom
abroad.
The Tachiona I court recognizes that states' practices may be
312 See Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
313 See id. at 429.
314 Id. at 428-29.
315 See id. at 429 n.109.
316 Id.
317 See id.
318 Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
319 See id. at 420.
320 Id. at 430.
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inconsistent, creating international and domestic laws that protect
human rights while violating those laws with their own
practices.3 2' The court finds some violations "sufficiently gross or
systematic" to be a more serious matter.322 The court condemns
"hypocrisy exposed and materialized in the power of the state
committed to organized brutality and violence inflicted against its
own people and specifically calculated to deny political freedoms
of . expression. 323 This Comment argues that the protection
from gross hypocrisy should be taken a step further and applied to
the subjects of an occupying power as well. An October 2004
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit overturned the Tachiona I ruling in part.324 The court of
appeals struck down the district court's holding against the
ZANU-PF and, in response to a cross-appeal by the plaintiffs,
upheld the district court's dismissal of the case against Mugabe
and Mudenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 325  The
government asserted that the district court erred when: "(1) it
placed the United States in violation of certain international
treaties; and (2) it usurped the executive branch's exclusive
authority to set the terms upon which the United States receives
foreign ambassadors. 3 26 The first criticism was interference with
American obligations to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Vienna Convention) and the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 327 The case was
decided upon the principle of diplomatic immunity, not based on
any Article 19 related issue.
In Tachiona II, the plaintiffs claimed that treaty violations
were not a concrete basis for an appeal. They cited Raines v.
Byrd, where members of Congress lacked standing to challenge a
statute because they "alleged no injury to themselves as
individuals .... ,328 The court of appeals found Raines
321 Id. at 432.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 433-34.
324 United States v. Tachiona, 386 F.3d 205, 224 (2d Cir. 2004).
325 Id.
326 Id. at 212.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 213 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997)).
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distinguishable because the court did not want to overstep its
constitutional boundary, while Tachiona H dealt with whether the
district court overstepped its bounds-an inquiry which "is the
standard grist of appellate courts.
3 29
The appellate court upheld the immunity of the Zimbabwean
officials as per the United Nations Convention on Privileges and
Immunities, which extend not only immunity for official acts, but
vaguely "other privileges, immunities and facilities ....
Mugabe was served with process while attending a political rally,
just after exiting a UN building. 33' Thus, the appellate court found
that the United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities
requirement that Mugabe be on his way to or from a United
Nations function was met.332  The appellate court held that the
question of head-of-state immunity is a moot point, since
diplomatic immunity was provided.333
The Tachiona H court applied the Vienna Convention's grant
of diplomatic inviolability, reversing the district court's finding
that there was no inviolability in regards to non-governmental
activities. 334  The district court cited Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, which permits suits against-and therefore service of
process on--diplomats in some circumstances. 335  The appellate
court reversed the district court's finding that Article 29 of the
Vienna Convention did not protect Mugabe and Mudenge from
service of process in regards to their affiliation with the political
329 Id. at 213. Also, the appellate court found that there was a non-abstract harm
alleged against the executive branch. Id.
330 United States v. Tachiona, 386 F.3d 205, 215 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting U.N.
Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 21 U.S.T. 1418, art. IV, § 1 (g), 1-2 U.N.T.S.
15).
331 See id. at 209.
332 See id. at 222.
333 See id. at 222-23. The appellate court was unwilling to provide a conclusive
answer to the question of whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies to
heads of state. The wording of the act, "agencies or instrumentalities" is not normally
understood to apply to people, though lower governmental officials have at times been
declared immune. Id.
334 See id. at 223.
335 United States v. Tachiona, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). But see 767 Third Ave.
Ass'n. v. Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 298 (2d. Cir.
1993) (explaining that the inviolability principle "makes no provision for exceptions
other than those set forth in Article 31 .... ").
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party.336
As it stands, the Court in Tachiona II did not address the
merits of the freedom of expression claims, but instead simply
dismissed the case, because it found the defendants immune to
prosecution. 337  The issue of immunity, while not the central
concern of this comment, could potentially prove fatal to any
extraterritorial freedom of expression claim. The district court
decision, had it been allowed to stand, would not have been
binding anywhere except the Southern District of New York.
However, it is significant because it contains the only substantive
discussion of the Covenant's freedom of expression guarantees in
the American courts.338 The Tachiona case is not a perfect fit for
an Iraqi freedom of speech claim, as Tachiona involved more
severe human rights violations than have accompanied the
censorship and propaganda in Iraq. However, Tachiona is a
counterpoint to the notion that the Brandenburg standard is useful
only where a "marketplace of ideas" exists. 339 As far as security is
concerned, Iraq has much more in common with Zimbabwe than
with the United States.3 40 Therefore, it is significant that both the
district court and court of appeals in Tachiona were willing to
accept a free speech claim arising in a repressive society.
V. Constitutional Protection at Home and Abroad
A tort claim against American contractors and the American
government may not be possible, due to the limits of international
law and the ATCA. Alternatively, it is useful to address the extent
to which Constitutional protections apply overseas, even in the
absence of any gross human rights violations. Section V of this
336 See United States v. Tachiona, 386 F.3d 205, 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
337 See id. at 205.
338 Tachiona v. Mugabe is not a perfect case for the freedom of press problems in
Iraq. Arguably, the freedom of expression denial in Tachiona, where the plaintiffs were
tortured and jailed for their attempts to oppose the government, are stronger instances of
human rights violations than have been sponsored so far in Iraq.
339 See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
340 See, e.g., CIA World Fact Book, Zimbabwe, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications
/factbook/geos/zi.html (Mugabe has ruled the country since 1987; caused chaos and food
shortages with a 2000 land redistribution campaign, and rigged the country's 2002
elections. General strikes by the opposition and labor grounds were met with "brutal
repression.").
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Comment examines the geographic reach of several Constitutional
amendments, exploring whether they apply to U.S. citizens and
non-citizens living abroad, and whether they apply to domestic
non-citizens.
A. The Evolution of Constitutional Protections for Americans
Abroad
The Supreme Court recognizes instances where it is
appropriate to guarantee Americans extraterritorial Constitutional
protections. However, the Court has been reluctant to grant aliens
living in the United States the protections of the Bill of Rights.34'
Generally, only "fundamental" Constitutional rights apply to
Americans abroad.342 In Reid v. Covert,343 the Court held that
when a United States citizen is tried in a military court outside the
United States, Constitutional protections still apply to that
citizen.344 In Reid, the Court decided that it was appropriate to
apply the Fifth and Sixth Amendments abroad.345 The Reid Court
placed limits on the American government's ability to act against
one of its citizens.346 The Constitution should be given weight
when the American government acts not only against its own
citizens, but against the citizens of a country under American
occupation.
The 1922 ruling in Balzac v. Puerto Rico states that the Sixth
Amendment did not apply to an American citizen in Puerto Rico
because it was a territory, rather than a state.347 The Reid court
distinguished Balzac, because Balzac "involved the power of
Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporary
territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions
whereas here the basis for governmental power is American
Citizenship., 348  The 1901 decision of Downes v. Bidwell
established that while Puerto Rico was a U.S. territory, the
341 See generally United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
342 Id.
343 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39-41(1957).
344 See id.
345 See id. at 6-7.
346 See id. at 7.
347 See Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-14 (1922).
348 Reid, 354 U.S. at 14.
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Revenue Clauses of the U.S. Constitution did not apply there.3 49
The Downes Court drew a distinction between some parts of the
Constitution, which may apply at any place or time, and other
parts that are only applicable within the United States. Downes'
dicta speculates:
[t]o sustain the judgment in the case under consideration it is by
no means necessary to show that none of the articles of the
Constitution apply to [the territory in question]. There is a clear
distinction between such prohibitions as go to the very root of
the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place,
and such as are operative only 'throughout the United States' or
among several States.35 °
The court considered that some parts of the Constitution, like
the Article I prohibition "[n]o title of nobility shall be granted by
the United States .. ,351 or the First Amendment, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.., abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press . ,,,352 may apply
anywhere, since the language limits Congress without expressing a
geographical limitation.3  The court distinguishes these instances
from parts of the Constitution which claim to be uniform
throughout the United States.354  Historically, Congress has
interpreted the Constitution as "applicable to territories acquired
by purchase or conquest only when and so far as Congress shall so
direct. 3 55 Perhaps in the future Congress could use that power to
ensure that people in countries occupied by the United States
receive some of the same constitutional protections as their
American counterparts.
In Best v. United States, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to United
349 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
350 Id. at 276-77.
351 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
352 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
353 Downes, 182 U.S. at 277. The Court declined, however, to give an opinion on
the geographic reach of the first eight amendments.
354 See id.
355 Id. at 279 (claiming that "the power to acquire territory ... implies not only the
power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United States will
receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be in what Chief Justice Marshall
termed the 'American Empire') (emphasis in original).
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States citizens in foreign countries under occupation by our armed
forces. 35 6 The Best court decided that the In re Ross dicta, "[t]he
constitution can have no operation in another country," is an
"isolated statement" and not controlling.3 57 In Ex parte Bakelite
Corp., the Court recognized the power of legislative courts
"created as a means of carrying into effect powers conferred by
the Constitution respecting treaties and commerce with foreign
countries. 358  Additionally, the Fifth Amendment's promise of
'just compensation" for the deprivation of private property applies
to American citizens abroad.
3 59
B. The Evolution of Constitutional Protections for Non-
citizens
There is no American law specifically granting non-citizens a
right of action for violations of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 concerns civil actions for the deprivation of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. 360 This law provides that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage... [in the United States] subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... 361
This law only applies within the United States.3 62 Congress has
the authority to enforce its laws beyond the borders of the United
States,363 though legislation is generally presumed not to have
356 Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950).
357 Id. at 138 (quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891)).
358 Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929). The Court in the instant case
only discussed the jurisdiction of those courts in regard to American citizens, however.
See id.
359 See Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464-65 (Ct. Cl. 1953); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
360 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
361 Id. (noting that the only exception in the law is an action "against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity.").
362 See id.
363 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("[W]hether
Congress has in fact exercised that authority in these cases is a matter of statutory
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extraterritorial application unless Congress clearly shows intent
otherwise.364 The following sections contain case law pertaining
to the application of the Fifth, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to non-citizens.
1. Fifth Amendment Protections for Non-citizens
In Eisentrager v. Forrestal, German nationals working in
China were captured and tried by the U.S. military during World
War 11.365 The appellate court granted their motion for a writ of
habeas corpus, and held that the Fifth Amendment applies to "any
person," including both citizens and non-citizens.366 However, the
Supreme Court reversed this decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager.367
The original Eisentrager dicta has since re-emerged in a series
of decisions which expand the rights of non-citizens.368 In Rasul v.
Bush, Australian and Kuwaiti petitioners challenged their
detention at Guantanamo Bay, claiming they were not enemy
combatants and had never been charged with a crime or provided
counsel. 369 The district court, citing Johnson's rule against habeas
corpus for aliens, dismissed the suit. However, the Supreme Court
held that American courts have jurisdiction, if not generally on
construction."); see also Benz v. Compafiia Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957).
364 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004). But see Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
365 See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 962-63 (1949), rev'd, Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
366 See id. at 965 ("[Cjonstitutional prohibitions apply directly to acts of
Government, or Government officials, and are not conditioned upon persons or
territory."). The court refused to draw a distinction between citizens and non-citizens "in
respect to the applicability of constitutional restrictions upon the power of government."
Id.
367 See generally Johnson, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
368 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 598-99 (2004) (holding that a U.S.
citizen, detained in Afghanistan as an enemy combatant, was entitled to receive notice of
the basis of his detention, and a trial); see generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (distinguishing between an alien who had
entered the United States and one who has not); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953) (giving an alien Fifth Amendment protection because he was a permanent
resident of the United States).
369 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466 (2004).
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Fifth Amendment issues, then at least on the question of the
legality of the detention of these non-citizens.37 ° The Supreme
Court found jurisdiction on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which
gives district courts jurisdiction to hear habeas cases brought "by
persons claiming to be held 'in custody in violation of the.., laws
S* *of the United States., 371  The Supreme Court found that
jurisdiction extends to aliens held in a territory over which the
United States "exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not
'ultimate sovereignty.' 371 The Supreme Court rejected the notion
that Johnson applied.373 The facts in Rasul differed from Johnson
in several key ways. The Rasul petitioners were not nationals of a
country at war with the United States, they claimed to be innocent,
and they had not been tried or convicted despite spending two
years imprisoned under American jurisdiction.374
The Supreme Court is more reluctant to apply Fifth
Amendment protections to aliens if there is a diplomatic strategy
behind the denial of Constitutional protections.375 In United States
v. Belmont, the American government denied Russian plaintiffs'
Fifth Amendment protections, with the intention that this would
"validate... all acts of the Soviet Government here involved from
the commencement of its existence. 37 6  United States v. Pink
involved a similar Fifth Amendment claim by Russian plaintiffs,
with the opposite outcome.377 The Pink plaintiffs were granted
Fifth Amendment protections because the Supreme Court chose to
recognize a New York decree granting the foreign creditors
370 See id.
371 See id. at 423.
372 See id.
373 See id. at 472.
374 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004).
375 See A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 393-94 (1997); see also United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937). Since only the property of non-Americans was
confiscated in Belmont, the Court held that "our Constitution, laws, and policies have no
extraterritorial operation, unless in respect to our own citizens .... What another country
has done in the way of taking over property of its nationals... is not a matter for judicial
consideration here." Id.
376 See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
377 See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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rights.378 The Court acknowledged that "aliens as well as citizens
are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment., 379  In a
third case, Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, the Court
reversed a judgment that the petitioner, an alien, lacked
jurisdiction to make a claim,3 80 holding that the alien was entitled
to compensation for property expropriated by the United States.38" '
The Act of June 15, 1917, which created the right to expropriate
property, also created the right to sue the government if the
compensation was not acceptable.382 Since the act did not deny
aliens the right to sue, they were allowed to bring claims.383 The
Russian Volunteer Fleet plaintiffs case was strengthened by the
fact that his claim arose out of a contract formed within the United
States.384 This distinguishes Russian Volunteer Fleet from Pink.
3 81
The Supreme Court's decisions in such situations appear to be
entirely dependent on the political motives behind federal
government actions.
2. Fourth Amendment Protections for Non-citizens
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez established that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to a Mexican citizen, living in Mexico,
whose property in Mexico was searched by American officials.3 86
It is distinguished from cases where aliens "have come within the
territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections within the country. 387 Justice Kennedy, however, in
his concurring opinion, stated that the defendant in Verdugo-
Urquidez would be entitled to Due Protection Clause protection
under the Fifth Amendment when his case went to trial.388
378 See generally id.
379 See id. at 228.
380 See generally Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (193 1).
381 See id. at 490.
382 Id. at 491.
383 See id. at 491-92.
384 See generally id.
385 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210 (1942).
386 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
387 See id. at 398.
388 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
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3. Fourteenth Amendment Protections for Non-citizens
Non-citizens are afforded partial protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Graham v. Richardson the Supreme
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents a state from denying welfare benefits based
on U.S. citizenship or residency.389  In the 2004 Soskin v.
Reinerston decision, the plaintiffs, non-citizens, sought a judgment
declaring Colorado Bill 03-176 unconstitutional, which would
have denied over 5,000 non-citizens Medicaid coverage.39 ° They
argued that it violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
discriminated against legal aliens.39 The court applied rational-
basis scrutiny to the bill's distinctions, since they were based on
non-suspect classification, and rejected the plaintiffs Equal
Protection claim. 392
Denying illegal aliens the right to enroll in public schools is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.393 In Plyler v. Doe the Supreme Court held that the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone,
citizen or not, who is subject to the United States laws. 394 The
Court found that
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined
to the protection of citizens. . . [the provisions of the
Amendment] are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of ... nationality; and the protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal law.395
389 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). Graham, however, only
applies to "lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States,"
entitling them to protection of the laws "of the State in which they reside." Id.
390 See Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2004).
391 See id.
392 See id. at 1267 n.2.
393 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982). But see Matthews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976) (denying aliens federal medical insurance until they have been residents
for five years does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
394 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212.
395 Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
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VI. Extending Jurisdiction Beyond the United States
A. The Headquarters Doctrine and Jurisdiction over Private
Corporations
Besides adding to the case law on the application of the
ATCA, the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
provides useful insight into the mechanics of a lawsuit against the
American government's international or extraterritorial actions.
Decided in July 2004, Sosa involved a Mexican national suing the
United States and another Mexican hired by the DEA who
illegally abducted him from Mexico and delivered him to the
United States, where he was arrested. 96 The respondent claimed
that the United States was liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, and that his kidnapper was liable under the ATCA.397 The
Supreme Court held that neither statute applied.398 The Court
recognized that the ATCA's jurisdiction extended to some claims
for violations of the law of nations, but the alien was only briefly
detained on his way to U.S. custody, which did not meet the
standard of a violation of customary international law.3 99 The
Federal Tort Claims Act contains an exception for "any claim
arising in a foreign country" 400 that applied in Sosa. The
government in Sosa claimed that the ATCA did not apply because
too much of the planning for his abduction took place in the
United States, so the crime did not arise in a foreign country, as
the law requires. 40 ' However, the Supreme Court rejected this
argument. The court was concerned that the "headquarters
doctrine" could "swallow the foreign country exception,"
rendering the statute practically useless.40 2 The case law suggests
that "[a] headquarters claim exists where negligent acts in the
United States proximately cause harm in a foreign country. 4 3
396 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
397 Id. at 698.
398 Id.
399 Id. at 735.
400 See id. at 698.
401 Id. at 702-03.
402 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 702 (2004).
403 See id. at 699.
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Only in the past year or two have private American companies
been held liable for human rights violations inflicted on non-
citizens. These human rights violations are generally jus cogens
violations, such as torture and murder, not the more mild
deprivation of freedom of speech, but the ATCA has so far proven
quite useful in such suits. The landmark November 2004 decision
in Jama v. United States INS 4 expanded the reach of the ATCA
to private companies.4 °5 A few corporations have already been
sued under the Act for their roles in the Abu Ghraib Prison
abuse,40 6 and the Jama case settled the question of whether the Act
applied to American corporations.4 7 The Jama court allowed the
plaintiffs to sue the private company that ran their immigration
detention center under the ATCA and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts.40 8 The plaintiffs complained of abuse, denial of
medical treatment, and unfit living conditions.40 9 The court of
appeals upheld the district court's decision that aliens have
recourse in American courts when they are suing private
companies over human rights abuses.410
In December 2004, the Union Oil Corporation of California
reached a settlement with a number of Myanmar villagers who
sued the company under the ATCA.411 The villagers alleged that
the oil company directly and indirectly subjected them to torture,
rape, and murder while engaged in building a pipeline in
404 Jama v. United States INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004).
405 See id. at 361.
406 Mary P. Gallagher, Companies Running Detention Centers Can be Sued for
Human Rights Violations, 29 N.J.L.J. (2004), http://www.law.con/jsp/article.jsp?id
=1101136522872.
407 See id.
408 See id. The IMN is overseen by Harris Corporation, one of the Pentagon's
largest contractors. Harris Corporation earned $165 million from Department of Defense
contracts in Fiscal Year 2002; see also Katrin Dauenhauer & Jim Lobe, Massive Military
Contractor's Media Mess, ASIAN TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, http://www.atimes.com
/atimes/MiddleEast/EH16Ak02.html; see also Center for Public Integrity, supra note
67, http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro.
409 See Gallagher, supra note 406.
410 See id.
411 See John Doe v. Unocal Corporation, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Myanmar.4 2 The settlement followed a 2002 Ninth Circuit
decision allowing the case to continue and overturned a district
court decision in favor of the defendants.4"3 The Unocal decision
is one of about three dozen similar suits against major American
corporations in the past decade, and so far it is the first to have
actually gone to trial.414 The settlement is seen as a breakthrough,
especially since Unocal was sued over torts committed not by its
employees, but by third parties responsible for securing the
company's pipeline. 4 5  The Unocal decision is evidence that
American corporations might be liable for turning a blind eye to
human rights violations committed in foreign countries against
non-citizens.
B. Jurisdiction over Foreign Conspiracies
If the ATCA and TVPA do not provide a remedy in American
courts for the free speech violations occurring in Iraq, one
alternative is to extend the protections of American law to the
citizens of countries under U.S. occupation. Some federal
legislation is written specifically to have an extraterritorial
application. These laws illustrate the fact that American laws are
sometimes applicable to foreign people or property.
American law criminalizes conspiracies to destroy foreign
property, even if the conspirators never leave the United States.
While the issue discussed in this comment is not a conspiracy to
destroy foreign property, it is interesting to note the willingness of
American courts to extend jurisdiction to conspiracies, persons,
and property located in foreign countries. 18 U.S.C. § 956
concerns "conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or
damage property in a foreign country." '4 16 It applies to people,
within the jurisdiction of the United States, who
conspire... with one or more persons, regardless of where such
other person or persons are located, to damage or destroy
specific property situated within a foreign country and belonging
412 See id. at 936.
413 See id. at 937.
414 See Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at
Al.
415 See id.
416 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2005).
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to a foreign government or to any political subdivision thereof
with which the United States is at peace [emphasis added]. . . if
any of the conspirators commits an act within the jurisdiction of
the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy. 7
Also included under the act is any "railroad, canal, bridge,
airport, airfield, or other public utility, public conveyance, or
public structure, or any religious, educational, or cultural
property., 418 Originally, when the law was written in 1917, it was
titled "[c]onspiracy to injure property of foreign government" and
applied only to property "belonging to a foreign government.
419
The greatly expanded modem version was written in 1966.420
As recognized in United States v. Elliott,4 1 the Constitutional
justification for such a law is the vesting of control of foreign
policy and commerce in the Federal Government.422  This
authority includes the right to regulate relations with foreign
countries and to prevent interference within internal affairs.423 In
Elliott, at issue was a conspiracy to blow up a railroad bridge. 424
The court noted the likelihood that such an action would disrupt
the American economy and seriously affect relations with
Zambia.425 The defendant took issue with the vagueness of the
term "at peace., 426  He argued that the term was not specific
enough because of the turbulent state of world affairs. 427 The court
did not accept this argument because the defendant did not make a
showing that the United States was not in fact at peace with
Zambia.428
American courts are willing to extend jurisdiction to include
foreign property and people in quite general and generous terms.
417 Id. § 956(b).
418 Id.
419 Id.
420 See id.
421 United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
422 See id. at 323.
423 See id.
424 See id. at 321.
425 See id. at 323.
426 See id. at 321.
427 See United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
428 See id.
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In 2003, the law was used to convict a man of conspiring with Al-
Qaeda to raise money that would be used to injure persons in
foreign countries with which the United States was at peace.429 In
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the Court noted that "in
cases immediately affecting national interests . . . [nations may
punish] acts done within another recognized jurisdiction.,, 430 The
defendants in United States v. Johnson took issue with the
specificity of the description of the foreign property at issue.43 1
They argued that the phrase "one or more of a total of less than
seventy military helicopters" was overly vague.432 The court
disagreed, holding that "the specificity requirement of Section 956
does not mean that the property which is the object of the
conspiracy to destroy needs to be described in minute detail. 433
C. Jurisdiction in Territories Controlled by the United States
Aside from the extraterritorial application of laws, as described
above, the United States is no stranger to unusual additions to
its jurisdiction.434  American laws apply in the organized,
unincorporated territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands and applied in
the Canal Zone of Panama until 1982. 4"' In American Samoa, an
unincorporated and unorganized territory, the inhabitants are
American nationals, but not citizens.4 36  The territory has an
independent judiciary, though the high court is appointed by the
U.S. Department of the Interior.4 37  In Guam, a territory of the
429 See United States v. Arnaout, 236 F. Supp. 2d 916, 918 (N.E. 2d 2003).
430 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1908).
431 See United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 575-76 (1st Cir. 1991).
432 Id. at 575.
433 Id. at 576.
434 See Dan MacMeekin, The Overseas Territories and Commonwealths of the
United States of America, http://www.macmeekin.com/Library/terr+commonw2.htm.
Examples of unusual arrangements include the Northern Mariana Islands, which is in
"political union" with the United States; its inhabitants enjoy American citizenship. The
Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands are sovereign
nations which enjoy a "free association" with the United States. The Midway Islands are
under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. Id.
435 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3241 (2004); 22 U.S.C. § 3831 (2004).
436 CIA World Factbook, American Samoa, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications
/factbook/geos/aq.html.
437 See id.
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United States, federal laws apply. 438 The U.S. Constitution gives
Congress the power to recognize territories and "to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States .... While Iraq
is not a territory, until July 2004 it was an occupied state, so
claims originating from occupied Iraq should perhaps carry a
different weight than simply the claims originating in foreign
states.
VII.Conclusion
Iraq, like Bosnia ten years ago, is an ethnically and religiously
divided country, and its media sources are largely partisan and
politically motivated with varying degrees of credibility. In
Bosnia, the Communications Regulatory Agency has so far
successfully created a "marketplace of ideas," where one radical
and offensive idea is moderated by a less extreme viewpoint, or
countered by an equally extreme opinion on the other end of the
spectrum. In the few months after Saddam was removed from
power, hundreds of media outlets sprang up in Iraq. Instead of
regulating these bodies and playing the referee in Iraq's new
media industry, the United States and the new Iraqi government
have reigned in the press. The loudest dissenters in Iraq, Al-
Jazeera and Al-Iraqiya, were kicked out of the country. Other
offending outlets have been closed, with little regard to American
freedom of press standards, international norms, or even Iraq's
new legal code. Instead of regulating the new Iraqi press, the
Americans, through Harris Corporation, are trying to dominate it
by funding a propaganda empire that is not training a new, free
Iraqi press, but instead dictating what the Iraqis may say.
Tachiona I is the most relevant case on the issue, and if the
district court's ruling had been allowed to stand, it could have
solidified a right of action by Iraqi citizens against Harris
Corporation, its predecessor, SAIC, or the American government.
The Tachiona case is not a perfect fit, as it deals with a claim
against a foreign government, and involves more severe human
rights violations than anything that has occurred so far in Iraq.
438 See CIA World Factbook, Guam, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications
/factbook/geos/gq.html.
439 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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Additionally, some Bill of Rights protections extend to Americans
beyond our borders, though the Constitutional protections afforded
non-citizens living abroad are fewer than those granted
Americans.
Absent the possibility of a legal remedy, a legislative solution
is within reach. U.S. law already provides a right of action for
Americans who are denied their civil rights by the U.S.
government.440 The next time America is an occupying power,
Congress could put a clause in the appropriations bill that funds
the conflict, conditioning monetary support on the protection of
free speech in the occupied state. The American people have a
public interest in a free Iraqi media. The cost we have paid in
lives and tax dollars has tied us to the fate of the country. The
president has the constitutional prerogative to conduct the
American occupation of Iraq in the way that he sees fit, but he also
has the obligation, as set forth in his oath of office, to "preserve,
protect, and defend the constitution of the United States.""' If
"Operation Iraqi Freedom" is violating the First Amendment of
the Constitution, then the courts or Congress are obligated to
address this overstep of executive authority. 442
BRENNER A. ALLEN
440 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
441 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
442 See generally U.S. CONST. art. III.
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